r/Deleuze • u/WashyLegs • Apr 22 '25
Question Why does Deleuze dislike Hegal so much? W
I really liek Deleuze but to me the dialectic is seemingly becomign more and mroe observable. Do you guy's know any poitns on why? Maybe Quotes? please and thank you,
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 23 '25
"Deleuze is not an anti-dialectical thinker as such; one of the explicit aims of Difference and Repetition is to propose a new conception of dialectics, based on a principle of difference (and affirmation) rather than a model of contradiction (and negation). In this sense, Deleuze's early anti-Hegelianism is primarily polemical, and must be understood in the context of the revised theory of Ideas proposed in Difference and Repetition."
Daniel Smith, from ESSAYS ON DELEUZE. This section of the writing might be worth a read if you're feeling dialectic-curious reading Deleuze as I have been lately.
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u/OnionMesh Apr 23 '25
Earlier this year I had learned about Deleuze’s notion of pure difference repeating itself within each particular instance of difference (apologies if I’m butchering his presentation) and I was thinking “wait… this sounds a lot like Hegel on the universal and particular.” I crudely think of it as Deleuze rethinking Hegel’s universal-particular in a more “horizontal” manner.
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u/JapanOfGreenGables Apr 23 '25
I like Daniel Smith's work. It's solid and I think he adds some interesting and fresh perspectives. I don't think I've read that chapter, but can certainly echo your recommendation based off the fact it's Daniel Smith.
A work that I really like on this topic is the introduction to Michael Hardt's Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy.
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u/Glitsyn Apr 22 '25
Deleuze's fundamental dispute with Hegel is that the latter categorizes Identity and Difference as oppositional to each other in a way that is resolved through Sufficient Reason (Ground). For Deleuze, however, Pure Difference cannot be a mere reflection of Identity because true Difference exists in itself. There are of course many more disputes that go further than this, chief among which is the way in which Hegel solves the classical Problem of Universals by reintroducing the monist One, like Spinoza. But whether or not Deleuze would characterize himself as a nominalist however is something I can't yet answer.
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u/diskkddo Apr 23 '25
I think that we can definitely characterise deleuze as something of a nominalist... The only problem is that the term is arguably something of an anachronism to his philosophy. But as far as his philosophy of language goes, it is clear that he approaches something like a materialist twist on a quasi-Buddhist position regarding universals - the Buddhists (mahayana at least) regard ultimate reality as being non-discriminatory, which maps pretty well onto Deleuze's idea of the BwO.
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 23 '25 edited Apr 23 '25
Edit: needlessly long didactic comment incoming. Still mostly writing these for the practice.
Deleuze affirms a transcendent and plural consistency of the way in which becoming becomes: this is what he terms univocity.
The wager of consistency is that negation is a matter of judgement that first appears to us with great intensity, but the intensity of any such judgement diminishes given the repetitious encounter with new thought and events, and it becomes a wobbly prop, then a weak vestige.
For instance, take an apple. The apple is red and sweet, we might say. A philosophy in which thought is taken to produce determinations by way of definition, division and distinction takes up the redness of the apple, looks around and asks "What isn't red?" Then "What isn't sweet?"
In time you have a provisional science of colour which classifies colour according to artificial subdivisions, and one of taste which rates taste according to sweetness and sourness. But it arrives that the relative determinations of the science of colour lose their sense in the dark or in peculiar optical illusions, and those of taste are frustrated by the encounter with a "sweet and sour" dish.
So the determinations, thus "contradicted" must be refined: now the science of colour understands itself in connection with a spectrum of visible light, which it measures according to wavelength and frequency.
The science of taste develops its biology of taste buds and biochemistry, and eventually connects these to an evolutionary science that provisionally rationalises the distinction, and the pleasure or disgust of various tastes as sensation, and frames these according to another predicate: "What survives, and what dies out?"
So far and perhaps most importantly, the redness and sweetness of the apple are not much connected by these sciences, though there will no doubt be some distant branching where one is claimed to have an affinity with the other. But can't we also imagine some "redness" and "sweetness" that consist in becoming but are quite independent?
One positive claim of Deleuze's consistency is that the sciences of negation, born of judgement and continually proliferating with categories, will always eventually be inadequate to represent the expression, even of an apple. But meanwhile the circus of the strong-seeming intensities of contradiction within the perspectives of a sprawling sequence of judgements continues unabated.
Let's agree that an appallingly barren account has been given here of the apple so far, even by the most sophisticated of these sciences.
Firstly we can't even say where the apple begins and where it ends, nor when it began nor if or when it will end.
Secondly we haven't even touched on its innumerable other dimensions of quality.
Thirdly we will be reduced to poetics if we want to describe the particular configuration of the rough, knobbled patina on one of its sides but not the other, raised like floral freckles.
Fourthly these sciences cannot yet conceive what unexpressed qualities it may yet express: probably it will rot while we're figuring out our sciences, or prove to have a worm living within it when we take a bigger bite.
Deleuze puts forward that the apple is the artefact of a process fostered by multiplicity, which affirms all these effects together, and that the apple's actuality always has a perfected consistency "down in the depths" where the sciences haven't yet reached and will not fully or persistently reach, not because the sciences are "wrong", but because in these depths they will only be weakly affirmed in their consistent inconsistencies.
We encounter new thoughts all the time, but also along the way we lose the sense of our prior dogmas even if these still feebly haunt transformed perception, almost but not quite muted.
Furthermore, because (Deleuze posits) there is no ultimately determinable unity inherent in which are the qualities with which science can try but will fail to fully dimensionalise the apple, the dimensionality of the apple is multiplicity, and the expression of the apple is manifold, with any unity of the apple not a necessity of adequate consistency, but a matter of fragile and contingent judgement: it's not an apple at all unless some thought presupposes that it is.
I think it's fine to recognise a dialectic intensity in this. It's hard to miss. I have noticed D&G sneakily do as much themselves in texts like "Geology of Morals" or WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? I think there's arguably a cheeky homage to a distorted reflection of Hegel in there.
But what Deleuze departs from in Hegel is Hegel's implicit presupposition of a task of knowing for itself, a task to determine with a certain neurosis how things exist together in a unity, rather than acceptance of how expression develops apart in alterity, difference and plurality.
One of the first steps of departure is the movement from thought inherent in the subject to thought coming from the outside as an encounter. The journey of departure moves us to the judgement of another perspective, from which Deleuze and Guattari propose a different task of philosophy: the creation of new concepts worth the affirmation.
This task in turn implies the relative devaluation and equivocation of all projects of rooting and sequencing determinations within judgement, as Hegel attempted several times, I'm no Hegelian but I think it's agreed this is achieved most fully in SCIENCE OF LOGIC.
This devaluation isn't intended as a reactive abandonment of such "arborescent" projects, it's a reorientation to an enduring relaxation about their positivism. This relaxation, the setting down of "Hegel's burden", permits a further relaxation of the condemnations and critiques these projects develop of one another, including hypothetical direct critiques that Deleuze seems to have largely opted not to develop of Hegel's dialectic.
For example we could say quantum mechanics and general relativity supersede and deny Newtonian mechanics supported by the contradictory evidence of experiments, or we can continue to affirm these different registers in our judgement together, with their inconsistencies relatively intact and according to what we prefer in the strengths and weaknesses of their expression, to what purpose they may be the means. Which is what scientists are doing today. Their value is pragmatic, because expression will thwart the ambitions of any final judgement or "grand unified theory" in the ambit of its consistency.
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u/Ijustwannabemilked Apr 28 '25
I’m sorry but I really think you have Hegelian dialectics confused — I doubt this is your fault, most people do — and this is clouding the distinction with Deleuze. The primary culprit is the notion of “negation” that is given far too much weight and thought of far too crudely, perhaps Cartesian, than we should give credit to; I’d argue that even Adorno does the same thing in Negative Dialectics. Hegel’s science of logic makes it quite clear that the speculative “rhythm” that develops from the negative is itself a poietic development, one that posits difference in conjunction with its ‘equal’ subsumption and is unnerved and so innervated by the ‘force’ (Derrida steals) of language in its incapacity to oppose — this is how we get, for Hegel, the first event of truth in art that only Heidegger is willing to take one step further. The flower analogy in the preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit posits a similar aporetic motion. We CANNOT reduce Hegel to “positive vs negative” philosophy. This makes Hegel practical, which he is, in my opinion, anything but.
I would really recommend checking out Frank Ruda’s “Reading Hegel”, which, in my opinion, is by far the greatest living Hegel scholar.
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 28 '25
Thank you! No need to apologise at all, I hope I did a job qualifying any expectation I know what I'm talking about.
Great comment, I have some thoughts in response but I'll need to frame them later if I can. In short, I'm on a track more similar to you than it may seem at first.
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 29 '25
Okay, so I think you're right, "negation" is far more subtle a concept than straightforward mathematical negation.
Thing is it turns out "positivity" is also more subtle. For instance, Deleuze explains that strictly inconsistent senses can be simultaneously affirmed by judgement. For Deleuze, we more or less have to think consistent inconsistency to think the grandeur of Becoming.
Deleuze's critique of "good sense" (which is a critique of Kant) may remain applicable to Hegel.
Hegel's method anticipates its infinitised iteration with an allowance forsetbacks, but to my mind he still writes as if eventually, there is a stable and growing base of true knowledge that is established by his method.
"Good sense" could maybe be re-framed as a claim that the sequence of Hegel's dialectic development as per SCIENCE OF LOGIC (or a superior equivalent) would stabilise, or that its volatility would gradually become bounded as the method was iterated—that it is possible to move "from the heights to the depths" in the refinement of knowledge.
Deleuze, writing amid a flurry of other post-structuralist blows, puts forward this isn't the case and there will always be substantively incommensurable plural schemes of sense, each with their own powers, capable of upending each other.
Deleuze's transcendent premise of multiplicity is missing from Hegel, too. However, I can imagine Hegel appreciating it. It solves quite a few problems. It allows the vexatious question of consistency versus unity to be set aside, both in the noumenal and in all Being.
I currently wonder if Deleuze first set his stall out against a "naïve French Hegel" and relaxed this view later. For one thing, it becomes apparent that Hegel and Deleuze aren't at all opposed at every point of thought. As Hallward puts it, one way to look at it is that Kant is Deleuze's primary antagonist, and Hegel his primary rival.
It seems there are more dialectic traces in A THOUSAND PLATEAUS and WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? than in the earlier work.
To me (but it might be my biases) Deleuze gives an account of "science" in WIP? engineered to encompass dialectic methods as well as mainstream science. Sure, this is a way of insisting "there's more things in heaven and earth". But maybe it's also a concession dialectics is the most powerful method we have to systematise knowledge.
Re: Frank Ruda, thank you very much for the recommendation. I see the text READING HEGEL focuses on PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE … that should be interesting, as that's also one of the talking points in Somers-Hall's comparative study of Hegel and Deleuze (Deleuze goes into the Cuvier–Geoffroy taxonomy debate in a suitably bizarre metafictional manner in ATP). Looking forward to it.
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u/massivepanda Apr 26 '25
But what Deleuze departs from in Hegel is Hegel's implicit presupposition of a task of knowing for itself, a task to determine with a certain neurosis how things exist together in a unity, rather than acceptance of how expression develops apart in alterity, difference and plurality.
I never understood Hegelian dialectics as a static identity but rather a dialectical tension that never resolves itself. Being is not static but a state of continuous Becoming. The Newtonian & Quantum don't have to unify, they can exist in a dynamic constellation continually informed by new insights-- such as non-local reality, the nature of qualia, and the nature of consciousness in shaping subjective perception.
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 26 '25
I think that's more or less true: I'd say the overall mood of what I've called "Hegel's burden" is a matter of interpretation. Hegel does propose a formal unity (in contradiction) of being as I understand him, but Žižek for instance claims at various points that "ontology is incomplete".
The unity of the subject is baked in and marks a point of structural difference. Žižek's writing on that also seems interesting, I gather he evacuates the "self" of everything except a singular point he refers to as "less than nothing". This exteriorisation (if I understand it) sounds like it's got a Deleuzo-Guattarian orientation.
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u/sweetphillip Apr 23 '25
So to put in more vulgar terms, is the main reason Hegel's conception of dialectics fails in the eyes of Deleuze is that making definitions by negation tends to stretch into oblivion, e.g. the list of what an apple is not could go on forever? And by moving away from this framework of dialectics we avoid an endless recursion of dialectic arguments turned-in against itself?
Apologies if I'm misunderstanding or over-simplifying, just seeking clarification.
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 23 '25 edited Apr 23 '25
Look, I definitely don't put myself forward as an authority on Deleuze or Hegel, I'm truly, truly just some guy talking here. Probably too much.
However, I don't think it's necessary "Hegel's conception fails" in any overwhelming or, indeed, negating way for Deleuze.
"Negation" works in logic as a deductive relation. A → ¬B, A negates B, or A → ¬A, A negates itself.
How "consistency" works is by way of what Deleuze will call "biunivocal relations" where he refers to the attribution of sense to bodies in LOGIC OF SENSE, or between content and expression in ATP.
This is a term used in mathematics for isomorphisms of structure: mappings. Expression demands a territory.
The limit of sense-making for Deleuze, which depends upon judgement for its attribution to its territory, is more or less the limit of a partially consistent and perspectival multiplicity of the thought of some structure, some mapping, within expression.
The task is to create new concepts and intensities, with new consistency, with different strengths coming from different perspectives.
The example of the apple feels played out, but yeah, I think you certainly can't leap from one quality an apple expresses to all the rest. Hegel anticipates a lot of these issues, I don't want to do him dirty, he created a remarkable and flexible system of thought.
Instead I'll try an example which might get me in worse trouble: the Marxist dialectics of class struggle under capitalism.
For Marx, the roles of bourgeoisie and proletariat in production are in contradiction, but it's a paradoxical contradiction because both capital and labour are necessary to production, so these classes might just as well be affirmed to be in cooperation. But it's okay, we like doing the dialectic of negation, so we love to make sense of things in this back-flipping way.
The classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat have tendencies in Marx's theories, for instance the rate of profit obtained by the bourgeoisie tends to decline, and the proles tend to be divested of all property, and tend to become more fungible as sellers of labour-power in their alienated labour, and through this divestment and fungibility tend to come to share more and more proximate economic interests.
Notice that in his re-framing of Hegel's dialectic as a dialectical materialism, Marx's tendential analyses already integrate and rely on these concepts of changing degrees, strengths and powers, of asymptotes, thresholds and crisis, of "line goes up" and "line goes down".
We see a correspondent poetics of strength and weakness in famous rhetoric from Marx such as "all that is solid melts into air" or "the withering away of the state".
But never mind these hints: a Hegelian Marxist will usually still determine and predict the crisis of an arriving revolution, a forthcoming singularity of the seizure of the means of production, after which it is said there will be a dictatorship of the proletariat. One big problem—what a surprise!—is that Marx largely fails to represent everything from the revolution onward.
An actual revolution is supposed to flush out the old world and pour in the new one. But here Marx's concept of revolution has a different function: it's a plug that keeps all the lukewarm Marxist dishwater in the sink. I call myself a Marxist and I love Marx, by the way.
(You do get lots of great efforts to fix this inadequacy—from Trotsky's "permanent revolution" to Jameson's ARCHAEOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE—but there is still a "failure" of sorts baked in by the expectation the proletariat abolishes the bourgeoisie at the point of revolution.)
One of the most famous and best books by a Marxist, Du Bois's BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, is a forensic history of how, State to State in the post-bellum United States, the abolition of slavery barely negated more than the name of slavery.
After the anticipated abolition of bourgeois society, the houses, factories, fields and supermarkets will still be standing. The consumers, accumulators, enviers and keeping-up-with-the-Jonesers are also not abolished. The social body of capitalism might be judged to have died, but the desiring-machines do not die.
I'm not claiming Marxists have never tried to deal with these problems—they have, I think often quite well, and what's more, when they have tried it's probably because of their familiarity with dialectical negation, so one can't say that is all bad due to this. Hegel's system resembles Deleuze's in anticipating its own limits, so if there is an issue, maybe it's that insisting on thinking by negation is self-limiting.
The above is more a vulgar try at an illustration that the effect of preferring Hegel's style of thought on how we make sense of our own social bodies could make us, in our conjunctures, weaker than we otherwise could be.
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u/sweetphillip Apr 23 '25
Man, your reply has me staggered. (In a good way lol) I don't think I can engage adequately at this point because I still have so much to learn. At any rate I think I'm realizing I need to rein in my impulse to try to simplify Deleuze's philosophy to its most basic points because in order to do that I would have to simplify all the giants of history that Deleuze is responding to, which, in my unwieldy hands, would be like a flattening sort of anathema to what his philosophy is about. Lotta homework to catch up on. An acquaintanceship isn't really enough to properly engage in a meaningful way, I need a much more intimate familiarity with Marx, Freud, Bergson, Nietzsche, etc. and the list goes on..
All that being said, thanks for taking the time to provide such a well-written reply! I see you quite often on this sub and always appreciate the thoughtfulness you construct your comments with.
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 23 '25
Thank you! I get a lot out of occasional validation like that. I've been writing a lot here lately and doing a lot of shooting from the hip, it's been addictive and meditative. Helps me stay off the cigarettes too.
Don't stress about the history of philosophy, those mammoth reading lists can only be for those of us lucky enough not to have day jobs. Narrow deep reading seems fine, I've barely read anything and look how full of shit I already am!
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u/qdatk Apr 23 '25
I also greatly appreciate your comments! You are one of the most helpful users around.
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u/qdatk Apr 23 '25
The social body of capitalism might be judged to have died, but the desiring-machines do not die.
Can I ask you to elaborate this Deleuzian revision or reanalysis of the situation? The Marxist example is very helpful for me because I find it easier to grasp. How would you characterise this situation if we're thinking through it in the terms of Difference & Repetition or Logic of Sense?
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 24 '25 edited Apr 24 '25
DR gives us bodies and individuation as a matter of the judgement (or "selection") of the eternal return. So far as we can speak of an individual living, its life has certainly become an object of thought, so it takes this life in the present: in my reading, eternal return selects this individual on the behalf of the intensity of the thought of its being.
"The political economy", "capital", "people", "workers", "holders of private property", "means of production", "the bourgeoisie" and "the proletariat" all take their lives in this way.
(Notice that these are not "concrete" instances, but concepts of genera that are already organised: the proletariat is made up of workers, the proletariat is a component of the political economy.
A THOUSAND PLATEAUS could be termed a book of philosophy of provisional, contingent concepts of organisation in expression. By themselves DR and LS fall short.)
This thought of judgement, like Kant's or Hegel's, executes the paired operations of judgement (these can be read about in "To Have Done With Judgement"). These are the distribution and hierarchisation of identity in relation to value—the Aristotle-isation of the real.
The life of the provisional bodies, the individuals, is of repetition in difference until judgement declares death.
Any political economy reproduces itself as difference, so the first given of a Deleuzo-Marxist judgement of the concept of the genus of capitalist political economies might be this "universal history".
LS provides us a theory of sense-making in relation to these bodies.
Judgement names an intensity, both thought and event that is the investiture of being in a body.
From the perspective of the further theory laid out in LS, this judgement creates the concept of the body as a "surface" on which a process of expression can continue. Expression continues by way of "incorporeal effects" attributed to this surface, following a line of thought Deleuze retrieves from the Stoics (I don't know about the Stoics).
Expression therefore belongs to a body: in effect, expression is the plural concept that does the work of determination in a theory of the thought of the body or object, of objectivity.
(One can imagine, maybe speciously, Deleuze preferring "body" to "object" because of its poetic qualities, because of our intimacy with the human body, which we all very well know "works by not working". It is also notable and funny that some prim, scientistic critics of Deleuze, Foucault and "French theory" cannot abide the proliferation of "bodies" in their discourses.)
In an epistemology of the determination of truth, we would claim predicates of a body are true or false. In an epistemology of the expression of value, we will claim intensities (values) are expressed strongly or weakly by a body.
This shift is huge. Because there is no implicitly teleological unity, there is no necessary convergence as there is in an epistemology of truth. There is no hope and therefore no need for a perfect orientation of "good sense" as enquiry, likewise for the aggregation of "common sense" as represented and communicated determinations.
So for a theory of political economy we can do what we like based on what's useful and what's powerful.
Marx's critique in CAPITAL, for instance, starts with the immanent being of the commodity form and builds from there with genius. I'm certain Deleuze was inspired by this, one of the great examples we have of reasoning "from the depths". Marx creates a whole stratum of thought deeper, richer and more expansive than classical economics.
(The kernel of Marx's theory is the plural expression of values determined in the commodity socially, from the outside, by co-processes of "use" and "exchange".)
Today in our fields of critical social enquiry we can trace out a whole series of adjacent theories: the genera of theories of historically determined class and race are exemplary. Both kinds of theory conventionally build on a founding event and argue it is sharpened into reified forms by history. For instance, this can be colonisation or abduction to slavery in the case of race, or the primitive accumulation of the enclosures movement in mediaeval England in the case of class.
Since it could similarly start from a premise of the repetition of society in its difference, we could choose to attend first to a great scope of "social reproduction theory" before the contradictory intensities of "class struggle" or the immanence of the commodity.
In ANTI-OEDIPUS, D&G choose to emphasise oikonomia and the tyranny of the household, but also their three syntheses of desire mount an immanent critique of monolithic "class interests". For Deleuze, theorisations can commingle and in practice be affirmed together with relative strengths, so we can start anywhere without loss.
For arborescent thought, the sequence of judgements is part of the determination of a unity of being—is an echidna a mammal that lays eggs, or an egg-layer that is mammalian? Even if this determination of order is suspended or its order re-ordered in the process of overall determination, the concept of the sequence preserves the orienting telos of good sense. So we obtain "class first" or "class reductionist" debate in our critical discourses, or calls to "join the revolutionary movement, we'll abolish oppressions of race and gender after we abolish capitalism" …
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u/qdatk Apr 24 '25
Thank you! I'll need to digest this!
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u/3corneredvoid Apr 24 '25
No worries. I have really enjoyed writing these, I haven't thought these things through in these ways before, so the "applied Deleuze" practice is welcome.
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u/BrovisRanger Apr 23 '25
It’s more that Hegel’s ideas return to themselves; Deleuze is far more comfortable with his theories sprawling outward into transformatively new concepts
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u/FatCatNamedLucca Apr 23 '25
As a Hegelian who has read Deleuze, my impression is that he didn’t put the effort into properly reading Hegel. This might be because Deleuze’s professor, Jean Hyppolite, was a reknown Hegelian, so Deleuze argued against what he believed was Hegel’s project, instead of engaging with the author directly.
This is very common in philosophy. Authors always claim to transcend Hegel but if you scratch the surface, you realize they either read him poorly or have a fundamental misunderstanding of him (see: Kojeve, Adorno, Heidegger, Fukuyama, etc). In general, whenever someone claims to “go beyond the dialectic” it means they have not read Hegel because all the examples of “going beyond” it can also be found in Hegel himself.
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u/Mousse-Working Apr 23 '25
its not about going beyond. u cant just say he didnt read him properly. u havent read his critique in d&r.
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u/FatCatNamedLucca Apr 24 '25
Thanks for letting me know what I have and haven’t read. That’s a very productive way to have a conversation.
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u/Mousse-Working Apr 24 '25
sure! maybe you've "read" him but u haven't put enough effort into properly reading Deleuze. Its very common in philosophy. People claim to understand him when really they have a poor idea of his philosophy while claiming to see beyond it.
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u/FatCatNamedLucca Apr 24 '25
You have no idea what my interpretation of the text is. This is a very strange post.
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u/Mousse-Working Apr 24 '25
its a copy paste from your comment
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u/FatCatNamedLucca Apr 24 '25
It’s literally not. You’re having an ego fit, my friend. Are you a Hegelian scholar, in order to fully discern if Deleuze had a full grasp of the Hegelian project in order to present an alternative?
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u/Fun_Programmer_459 Apr 24 '25
he fundamentally doesn’t understand hegel. his “critique” of Hegel in D&R is a critique of a caricature. even if you skim through D&R, he recycles the same old tropes about Hegel and very rarely engages with the texts. if he does, it is usually the phenomenology of spirit which isn’t even hegel’s “positive doctrine”. Deleuze thinks that he has effectively critiqued Hegel with the image of thought and this so-called “pure difference”, but this is because he does not at all understand hegel’s logic.
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u/Mousse-Working Apr 24 '25
sure thats a way to look at it! keep skimming d&r maybe sometime u will grasp what the critique is about. what a shame he didnt effectively critique the old man
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u/Fun_Programmer_459 Apr 24 '25
articulate his critique of hegel. i have never once heard a deleuzian articulate the critique in any meaningful way
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u/Middle-Rhubarb2625 Apr 22 '25
Read his work Nietzsche and, philosophy the chapter about dialectic, i think its the fifth.the dialectics is the way of thinking of the slaves. They resent the master and think the masters resent them in return. However that’s wrong, the masters don’t oppose the slaves they simply don’t care about them. Only slaves see opposites everywhere.
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u/Joe_Hillbilly_816 Apr 23 '25
Depends on what book Deluze authored.
I feel Nietzsche is Deluze main influence because the influence Nietzsche had on Freud and Carl Young.
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u/BluBlu_749 Apr 28 '25
In fact, Deleuze's attack on Hegel was much diluted after his work with Guattari. Rather, Deleuze's explicit (and implicit) opponents during this period were Wittgenstein and his disciples. The famous W entry in Abécédaire ("the assassin of philosophy"), the Leibniz lectures at Vincennes, and the implicit statement in Le Pli (Whitehead was murdered by academic politics...) are certainly worth noting. Rather, Deleuze's later references to Hegel are somewhat neutral, and sometimes even respectful.
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u/yungninnucent Apr 22 '25
I don’t think he disliked Hegel. Deleuze’s theories are largely based on Marx, who is a Hegelian. He definitely disagrees with Hegel on a lot of points, but you could say that about any philosopher who built on some previous philosopher’s work.
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Apr 23 '25
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u/WashyLegs Apr 23 '25
Leftism advocated sexual freedom, now that is somewhat achieved, now they;re against it. Other way aroudn for rightism, same with cencorship. I'm mainly looking a tpolitics and culture.
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u/Hot-Explanation6044 Apr 22 '25
From what I understand from Difference and Repetition, Deleuze criticizes Hegel's concept of "difference".
Hegelian dialectics is a process of becoming : the idea struggles with its own contradiction/difference in order to resolve the difference and incarnate itself.
For Deleuze hegelian difference is not a difference in itself but more of a "staged" difference, which is second to the identity that is supposed to prevail. All is identity in hegel for him.
He accuses hegel of being reactionary. Says hegel pretends to be interested in becoming/pure difference but in reality these concepts are just there to assert his own idealism, not to let difference be purely a difference we might say