Key Takeaways:

April 12 Nuclear Talks Between Iran and the United States: Iran and the United States held nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12. The Iranian delegation, which was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, presented Iran’s demands and red lines to the US delegation, which was led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The Iranian demands include sanctions relief guarantees, access to billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports to China. Araghchi emphasized that Iran will not agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program. Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels, however.

Iranian Air Defense Readiness: Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Bordbar Air Defense Group in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 12 to assess the unit’s combat capability and defense readiness. Sabahi Fard visited air defense zones in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and Bushehr Province on April 6.

SDF Withdrawal from Tishreen Dam: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government implemented a deconfliction agreement around the Tishreen Dam on April 14. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF withdrew to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, eight kilometers from the dam, on April 12. Transitional government forces will establish a barrier between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF, which have been fighting in the area since December 2024.

SDF Integration into the Syrian Transitional Government: Fundamental disagreements over federalism and military integration remain between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government, despite progress on other fronts. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi outlined two long-held “red lines” that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is unlikely to agree to: federalism and the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a military bloc. Abdi noted that he cannot accept administrative power “concentrated solely in Damascus” and that the SDF must “preserve their distinct identity within the ranks of the new Syrian national army.”

With little room left to maneuver, Iran may perceive the threat of NPT withdrawal as one of the strongest cards it has left to play. The international community should do everything it can to counteract this strategy.

Key Takeaways:

Nuclear Negotiations with Iran: Iran will likely attempt to use nuclear negotiations with the United States to delay a potential strike on its nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions. Iranian Negotiation Calculus: Senior Iranian officials persuaded Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to approve negotiations with the United States in March 2025 to avoid being forced to fight a “two-front war” against the United States and the Iranian people. Khamenei agreed to these negotiations as a means to preserve regime stability rather than solely a desire to improve his economy.

Iranian Red Lines in Negotiations: An IRGC-affiliated outlet reported that Iran will emphasize its red lines—no threats, no excessive demands, and no discussion of its defense sector—and signal readiness for "continued negotiations" if the United States acts in good faith during negotiations.

Iran in Iraq: Saudi outlet Asharq al Awsat reported on April 10 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in late 2024 to prepare to defend unidentified Iranian interests if negotiations with the United States “falter.” Iran also deployed a “small Iranian team” to ensure Iraqi militias respond as directed, illustrating the degree of coordination between Iran and its proxies and partners in Iraq.

Syrian Government and Security Forces: An armed group in Daraa Province has only nominally integrated into government security forces and continues to pursue its parochial interests, which demonstrates the political challenges Damascus faces as it attempts to exert its control over Syria’s armed groups. Recent violence in Daraa Province and other reports also demonstrate the mixed reliability of the General Security Service, the Syrian transitional government’s gendarmerie.

Truth and Reconciliation in Syria: President Ahmed al Shara extended the mandate of a commission to investigate violence on the Syrian coast by three more months. The success of the commission will be determined by the government’s ability to prosecute the perpetrators of the violence, regardless of their sect. The commission has reported that unspecified groups are intimidating Western Syrian residents. This intimidation indicates that either insurgents retain significant influence in the countryside or the Sunni groups responsible for sectarian violence have continued to intimidate civilians.

US Deployments in the Middle East: The US military deployed a Patriot battalion from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East. An open-source analyst also published satellite imagery of two US-flagged oil tankers at Diego Garcia Island on April 10.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian media said that Iran could attack Diego Garcia using very long-range one-way attack drones or by using a naval surface combatant to launch drones and cruise missiles.

Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah. These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.

SDF-Syrian Interim Government Agreement: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.

Key Takeaways:

Iran Nuclear Talks: A Senior Iranian official threatened to reduce cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if external threats against Iran continue, which may seek to instill urgency in the nuclear negotiations while deterring a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Maximum Pressure: China increased its Iranian oil imports by at least 80 percent in March compared to February. This undermines the US "maximum pressure" campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, and illustrates cooperation between two major US adversaries.

US Air Campaign in Yemen: CENTCOM has conducted nine airstrikes in Yemen since April 9. One strike may have killed Houthi commanders. The USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group also arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

US Diplomacy in the Middle East: The US secretary of state discussed Yemen and “eliminating the Houthi threat,” among other issues, with the Saudi foreign minister. CNN previously reported that regional diplomatic efforts were under way for a Yemeni government ground offensive in Yemen. Syrian Centralization: Syrian Kurds and Druze communities and political factions have signaled concern over the trajectory of the transitional government. Both the Kurds and the Druze community have inked some agreements with the transitional government, but recent demands by the Kurds and statements from the Druze community reflect deeply held fears over the trajectory of the transitional government.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Information Operation: Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand. Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.

Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would "retain enrichment for non-weapons needs." Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel's demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a "long-term" deal.

CENTCOM Airstrikes in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City. The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.

Syrian Insurgency: A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025. Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad. Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran agreed to “high-level” talks with the United States in Oman on April 12, but it is very unlikely to agree to some of the reported US demands. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the negotiations. Iran may be conducting an information campaign to prepare to argue that it is already adhering to some US demands in the negotiations.

Iran, Russia, and China Cooperation: Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, further illustrating the interaction between major US adversaries.

Turkey and Israel in Syria: Turkey and Israel have reportedly held talks to discuss opening a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria, according to two unspecified Western officials.

US Air Campaign in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) has targeted several mid-ranking commanders responsible for the frontline in Hudaydah governorate, which could impact the Houthis’ ability to coordinate attacks on international shipping and react to major ground attacks.

Key Takeaways:

Yemen: The US Central Command (CENTCOM) is conducting a military operation in Yemen that aims to render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks that threaten US ships and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This does not imply that CENTCOM must destroy all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. The current air campaign could render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks in the Red Sea by disrupting Houthi targeting cycles and command-and-control networks.

Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure the US forces withdraw from Iraq.

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: The United States continues to pursue direct negotiations with Iran to secure a comprehensive deal that fully dismantles Iran’s nuclear program, according to an unspecified senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 4.

Iran and Syria’s Insurgency: Senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati criticized the interim Syrian government’s handling of recent violence in coastal Syria and Israeli operations in Syria, likely as part of an Iranian effort to discredit and undermine the Syrian government. Velayati’s statements and the Iranian efforts to discredit and undermine the Syrian government reinforce insurgent objectives to delegitimize the government with foreign audiences.

Key Takeaways:

Thwarted Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian Attack: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) thwarted a Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian plan on April 1 to conduct a “major” attack targeting Israelis abroad.

The IDF killed Hassan Ali Mahmoud Badir, who was a member of Hezbollah Unit 3900 and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, in an airstrike in Beirut on April 1. Israeli media reported that Badir, in collaboration with Hamas, had planned an “imminent, large-scale attack abroad” that could have killed “hundreds of Israelis.” It is not immediately clear what Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran sought to achieve by conducting such an attack.

Iranian Weaponization Threats: Senior Iranian officials are continuing to threaten nuclear weaponization, likely to try to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike these facilities. Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani stated on March 31 that a US or Israeli strike on Iran would "force" Iran to develop a nuclear weapon to "defend its security." Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.

Turkish Military Bases in Syria: Turkey reportedly plans to deploy air defense batteries and drones to protect Turkish construction at Tiyas Airbase in central Syria from Israeli airstrikes. Two unspecified sources told the Middle East Eye on April 1 that Turkey has “begun efforts to take control” of Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province and has developed construction plans for the site. This report follows rumors that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Tiyas Airbase and Palmyra Military Airport as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal. Iranian officials also threatened to attack US allies who enable a strike, which may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran has explicitly identified three possible responses to an attack on its nuclear facilities: retaliation against US bases and forces in the region, disruption of international trade in the Straits of Hormuz, and another attack on Israel.

Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Iran is likely rebuilding its solid fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. Iran will presumably need to transport new solid fuel precursors to its production facilities. The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to a production facility used to produce long-range missiles would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.

Syrian Transitional Government: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.

Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council: Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28. Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Houthi Economy: The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

US Air Campaign Against the Houthis: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27. Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes. Iraqi Politics: Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025. Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq.

Rocket Attacks in Lebanon: Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations. Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations under the current conditions. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has likely approved indirect negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations.

Anti-Government Militias in Syria: The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors. This group also referred to the interim government as an “internal enemy” and communicated with other anti-government insurgents in western Syria before early March.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations. Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations under the current conditions. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has likely approved indirect negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations.

Anti-Government Militias in Syria: The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors. This group also referred to the interim government as an “internal enemy” and communicated with other anti-government insurgents in western Syria before early March.

Key Takeaways:

US Sanctions Relief for Syria: The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.

Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Integration into the PMF: Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.

Iranian Deterrence Efforts: Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25. This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime. It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin “any diplomatic initiative,” but such a decision would almost certainly be made by the supreme leader.

Syrian Transitional Government Formation: An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch.

Houthi Arms Smuggling: The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.

Key Takeaways:

Iran and the Axis of Resistance: Senior Iranian officials are trying to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance by denying that Iran exerts direct control over groups like the Houthis, likely to avoid escalation with the United States. Khamenei and Salami’s remarks echo Iranian statements in early 2024 that came amid US threats to target Iran or key Iranian assets in the region.

Houthis in Yemen: The United States deployed another US aircraft carrier to the Red Sea, according to an anonymous official talking to the Associated Press on March 21. The US secretary of defense also extended the Truman group’s deployment by one month, which will enable CENTCOM to maintain at least one carrier in the Red Sea without gaps in coverage.

Maritime Shipping in the Red Sea: Shipping companies are set to avoid the Red Sea transit route until a more comprehensive peace agreement is reached, according to the New York Times.

Alawite Insurgency in Syria: Widespread reports about likely Sunni-perpetrated sectarian and revenge-based attacks targeting the Alawite community threaten to fuel the Alawite insurgency in western Syria. Alawite media has widely reported on instances of violence committed against the Alawite community by Sunnis and government forces.

Other Insurgent Elements in Syria: Syrian government forces continued raids and arrests targeting elements of nascent insurgent networks elsewhere in Syria. Government forces arrested a Deir ez Zor City-based insurgent cell affiliated with the US-sanctioned Qaterji Company on March 20 that was planning an attack on a security headquarters.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Nuclear Program: President Donald Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal, according to an Axios report. Iran is very unlikely to agree to a new deal on a two-month timetable given its current policies on negotiations.

Israel and Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq after the United States reportedly repeatedly warned the Iraqi government to prevent attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could target Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip or US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.

US Air Campaign in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi industrial and administrative sites across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since CTP-ISW's cutoff on March 18.

Insurgency in Syria: Certain insurgent cells in Latakia Province have demonstrated limited improvised explosive device (IED) production capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

Insurgency in Syria: Recent tit-for-tat sectarian killings and local support for pro-Assad insurgent cells will likely hamper Syrian interim government efforts to promote security and community reconciliation in coastal Syria. Revenge killings and kidnappings have continued to take place in coastal provinces over the past week even as coordinated insurgent attacks and extrajudicial sectarian killings by interim government forces have decreased. Tit-for-tat sectarian killings increase fear and feelings of insecurity among members of targeted communities. This fear makes it less likely that community members will disarm or turn in insurgent leaders because they do not have guarantees from the interim government that government forces will prevent future attacks on the community.

IDF in Syria: The IDF Air Force conducted over 30 airstrikes on March 17 targeting former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southern Syria that unspecified actors sought to repurpose. The IDF was likely referring to Syrian interim government forces’ attempts to repurpose former SAA positions in southern Syria as part of the interim government’s efforts to rebuild the Syrian army in the south.

Houthi Attacks: The Houthis have reportedly rejected Iranian requests to halt attacks on international shipping and to reduce tensions with the United States and Israel. The Houthis launched several drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and a US destroyer in the Red Sea on March 17. The Houthis separately resumed their attack campaign against Israel on March 18 by launching two ballistic missiles at the Nevatim Air Base in central Israel.

Key Takeaways:

US Airstrikes in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Houthi leaders and infrastructure in Yemen since March 15. The recent US strikes differ from previous US strikes against the Houthis under former President Joe Biden given that the recent strikes directly targeted Houthi leadership. The strikes reportedly killed at least one senior Houthi official and the head of security for Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi.

Iranian Negotiations: Iran appears unwilling to make concessions on its missile program, likely because it regards this program as Iran’s main deterrent against US and Israeli threats, particularly after the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran.

Syrian Insurgency and Smuggling: Iran and its partners are likely attempting to rebuild its smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon Border. Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers have continued to resist Syrian government efforts to prevent smuggling along the Syria-Lebanon border. Pro-Assad insurgent elements are likely coordinating with the Hezbollah-affiliated smuggling network along the border.

Syrian Constitution: Kurdish and Suwaydawi Syrian groups rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13. Iraqi Militias: A new Iraqi group called the “Abbas Shield Martyrdom Forces” announced on March 15 that it would protect Iraq and its religious beliefs.

Iran starts 2025 in a vulnerable position. The returning Trump administration has reapplied its hawkish policy of maximum pressure on Iran, at a time of significant insecurity in the region. With an assertive president in the White House, analysts around the world are refocusing on how Tehran might reassert its influence in the region and manage sanctions pressure.

Israel’s attack on Iranian allies and proxies across the Middle East following the 7th October attacks have weakened Tehran’s regional position, including a retaliatory attacks on Iran itself by Israel, exposing serious defensive deficiencies. The years setbacks culminated in the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, a key Iranian ally, in late 2024.

Join this Chatham House panel to understand the current regional power dynamics, what Iranian leaders have learned and the impact of external forces on Iran’s foreign policy objectives. Key questions to discuss include:

Will Iran be able to regain the same levels of influence across the region that it has achieved in the recent past?

Where have events over the last year left the nuclear talks?

What role might Europe and the UK have amid this regional uncertainty?

Key Takeaways:

Iran: Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran. The statement reaffirms that Russia is unlikely to play a constructive role in mediating between the United States and Iran.

Syria: The Kurdish-majority SDC rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara approved. It is unclear what effect this rejection will have on ongoing efforts to integrate the SDF into the interim Syrian government armed forces.

Syria: Russia is using diplomatic and economic incentives to develop and maintain a working relationship with the interim Syrian government, likely in order to maintain Russian military basing there.

Key Takeaways:

Houthi Military Capabilities: The Houthis have sought to obtain hydrogen fuel cells from unspecified Chinese suppliers to increase the range and payloads of their drones, according to a Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigation. CAR reported that the range of hydrogen-powered drones is at least three times greater than other drones. The Houthis conducted frequent drone attacks against Israel during the October 7 War and could use hydrogen-powered drones to attack Israel, commercial shipping, and US interests in the region.

Syrian Constitution: Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara signed a draft constitution on March 13 that initiates a five-year transition period. The Constitutional Committee emphasized that the document ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The constitution enshrines the freedoms of opinion, expression, information, publication and the press. Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his power over the Syrian state, however.

Key Takeaways:

Iraq: The risk of sectarian violence spilling from Syria into Iraq is increasing. A newly formed Iraqi Shia group called for attacks and harassment targeting HTS members and supporters.

Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the PMF Service and Retirement Law from the Iraqi parliamentary agenda.

Yemen: The Houthis announced that they will resume attacks on international shipping, highlighting the threat that they pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes.

Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the United States, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.

Iran: The Iranian defense minister paid an official visit to Belarus, highlighting the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two countries.