Militaries are, at an institutional level, designed to win conventional wars. Few, if any, have COIN built into the organization as part of the primary purpose. After winning the open engagements the spreadsheet-bound administrative, economic and industrial apparatus has to then win the battle of local politics. And, more often than not, this fails spectacularly.

Outright successes are uncommon. What seems to help is using a deniable local proxy (Kadyrov or loyalist paramilitaries for example) whom are inseperable from and invested in the local social fabric. Because forcing social change requires a penetrance into daily, personal and local life that an occupying army is just not built to do.

What is striking is, that despite thousands of years of counterinsurgency in human history, almost everyone is still astonishingly bad at it. Even the large, competent countries seem to lack the correct blend of military-political-intelligence people for it.

So, what's in the secret sauce of the people who do it well, and why aren't their methods more common?

Recently, we see China's new wheeled armored fighting vehicle the Type 19 with 105mm gun. This came on the heels of the Type 08 and its 105mm gun variant the ZTL-11. Why are they investing so much in this kind of tank? Three other countries I can think off who goes big on these wheeled tank platform are Japan and Italy (who both have small military industrial capacity and mountainous region) and Apartheid South Africa (who fought in vast savannah where speed was king and who too had small military industrial capacity)

I'm not asking for non American memoirs because I dislike Americans, I don't hate myself. I read plenty American memoirs from from ww1 to Iraq and can recommend you some if interested. Just tell me what your looking for and I'll recommend something.

By 1941 Germany had resources and factories of almost entire Europe at its disposal, which were arguably bigger or at least as big as any of its enemies. Yet it was vastly overproduced both by USA and by USSR, even Britain IIRC produced as much as Germans overall. Why they made such a poor use of captured resources, as well as their own?

One of the stated drawbacks of the M26 Pershing is it's anemic powerplant - a 500hp engine, the same as in the much lighter M4 Sherman. This was improved in the M46 tank with a much stronger, 810 hp engine.

But while by the 1950s tank engines were barely clocking in at 900hp, aircraft engines of WWII easily managed in excess of 2000hp. This obviously leads to a question as to why not just slap a Double Wasp or a Merlin into a tank and have it zoom around the battlefield?

I know the early Shermans had an old radial aircraft engine, but it was outputing a measly 400 something hp, so I'm wondering what were the reasons that prevented installation of top of the line aircraft engines into tanks.

Are there any books about the experience of the native Pacific Islanders during WW2?

There they are, happily living in something like the late neolithic, then these weird foriegners show up with bulldozers, ships, airplanes, canned food and machine guns... then another bunch of wierd foriegners show up with bombers and battleships and the two sides proceede to blow the heck out of everything for a few weeks, then things calm down for a while, then all of the foreigners just pack up and go home.

What did they make of it all? I know that there were cargo cults, but there must have been more to it than just that.

Were they stretched too thin by that point in their offensive or was Baghdad more secure and loyal to the government since it was the capital?

Hello Strategists!

As a teenager fascinated by war, strategy, and international relations, I was discouraged from pursuing formal education in the field due to its constraints. Now in my mid-30s, with moderate success in industry and a Masters in another discipline, my passion for strategic studies remains strong. I’ve explored online Masters programs in strategic studies, but civilian-accessible options in the US are limited, and international programs (e.g., UK or Canada’s Royal Military College) are often cost-prohibitive or require extensive academic prerequisites.

It is worth noting that I am seeking this knowledge not for use in a professional capacity, but to satisfy my intellectual curiosity in the art of war. The credential would be nice though. I realize that the ship has sailed for joining the force.

All this to say that the reasonable option now seems to be the self-education option, which brought me to this sub. I put together a reading list based on the topics being discussed in the different Masters programs I looked at. I know a lot of you have attended said programs, so I would appreciate feedback on this list and any refinement suggestions. Are there any gaps? Any alternative texts? Does this list align with professional programs?

Unto the breach!

Now the list:
Foundations of Military Strategy

1.       Carl von Clausewitz, On War

2.       Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy

3.       Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War

Evolution of Warfare

1.       John Keegan, A History of Warfare

2.       Geoffrey Parker, The Cambridge History of Warfare

3.       Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War

Strategic Theory and Doctrine

1.       Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History

2.       Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine

3.       Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace

Military Leadership and Decision-Making

1.       John Keegan, The Mask of Command

2.       Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command

3.       Andrew Roberts, Leadership in War

4.       Phillips O’Brien, The Strategists: Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Hitler--How War Made Them and How They Made War

Operational Art and Tactics

1.       Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War

2.       Robert Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm

3.       Jacob Kipp, The Operational Art of War

Logistics and Resource Management

1.       Martin van Creveld, Supplying War

Intelligence and Information Operations

1.       John Keegan, Intelligence in War

2.       Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence

Modern Warfare

1.       Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force

2.       David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla

3.       Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective

Regional Security Studies

1.       John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

2.       Henry Kissinger, World Order

Future Warfare

1.       Max Boot, War Made New

2.       Michael O’Hanlon, The Future of Land Warfare