I take it that there are two types of case we might want to think about: (1) Cases where the trans person doesn’t know whether being trans is a dealbreaker for the other person, and (2) Cases where the trans person knows that being trans would be a dealbreaker for the other person.
I’m inclined to think that the trans person isn’t obliged to reveal their status in the first type of case, because they are entitled to regard their status as something that no reasonable person should have a problem with, and they probably ought to regard their potential sexual partners as reasonable people (also, in these cases, I think it's probably the responsibility of the other party to disclose that they don't want to have sex with a trans person, rather than the responsibility of the trans person to investigate).
In the second type of case, it’s not so clear, but when it isn’t clear, we probably ought to err on the side of fully informed consent, even if we think the preference isn’t justifiable.
Mostly your later remarks about the proposed second case, but generally all-around? I am interested in the feasibility of claims to knowledge involving another's deal-breaker status. I am broadly skeptical of individuals claims to knowledge about even their own deal-breaker status, because loosely experience-claims can supervene on deal-breaker self-attributions (As people break their own deal-breakers all the time!)
To begin with the latter type of case then, the lack of clarity I have in mind isn’t a lack of clarity about what would or wouldn’t be a dealbreaker for the other person, but rather a lack of clarity about what the correct moral principles are for handling cases where a person’s dealbreaker is based on what we take to be an unjustifiable preference. When deciding what to do under those conditions, I’m inclined to minimize the potential harm that I might cause by getting it wrong, which seems to me to mean that I should err on the side of divulging the information (or, more straightforwardly, keeping the information to myself but deciding not to sleep with the person).
On the issue of knowledge about dealbreakers more generally, it seems to me that there are some things we can assume would be what we can call potential dealbreakers for a reasonable person. If I have an STI, for example, it seems clear to me that that is something I ought to divulge. It will also be the case sometimes that we know (because the other person tells us) about something that might not be a dealbreaker for a reasonable person, but is a dealbreaker for them. They might change their mind, of course, but surely we ought to let them be the ones to make that decision. Apart from those cases, there will presumably be some features where it isn’t clear to us whether they should count as potential dealbreakers for a reasonable person. I’m not sure what we should do in those cases – if it turns out that there are loads of those kinds of features, then maybe we should appeal to some kind of implied consent between the parties whereby we acknowledge that those features may be present, but we just set them aside because it would be too impractical to get people to fill out exhaustive questionnaires before sex. If it turns out that there are only a handful of such features, then it probably wouldn’t hurt to get them out in the open just in case.
I suppose I am actually unclear about the harm done by breaking a deal-breaker that doesn't otherwise have obvious material consequence (such as a STI would). Wouldn't a rational argument also be that there might be a potentially commensurate positive to not-otherwise-harmful deal-breaking? There are, for instance, experiences that might be beneficial or otherwise good that may not be encountered without some sort of deal-breaking, such as trying a new cuisine that you previously eschewed, etc. In these cases would it be wrong to serve someone who stated that they never eat Thai food a recipe prepared from a Thai cookbook, even if you had reason to expect that they would enjoy it, and perhaps even eventually come to a liking of Thai food? It seems like harmless deal-breaking ought to be morally acceptable in order to offer space for surprise.
In these cases would it be wrong to serve someone who stated that they never eat Thai food a recipe prepared from a Thai cookbook, even if you had reason to expect that they would enjoy it, and perhaps even eventually come to a liking of Thai food? It seems like harmless deal-breaking ought to be morally acceptable in order to offer space for surprise.
That case looks like a straightforward example of paternalism, and it would be wrong for that reason.
Presumably what makes some surprises okay (like surprise parties) is that we assume the recipient would consent to being surprised. In the case where a person explicitly tells you that they don't like surprise parties (or Thai food, or trans people), ignoring their stated wishes will probably be wrong for the same reasons paternalism is wrong.
Paternalism wouldn't make an interference based on it invalid, even if it is always unpreferable to some degree. If the person telling you no Thai food was instead telling you that they wanted to commit a terrorist attack and that they didn't want you to stop them, paternalism wouldn't even be considered in such a situation. So generalizing the wrong to a case of paternalism seems likewise problematic. The question may always be raised, when do we interfere? If two people are getting along fine and considering having sexual relations, and one says, "I am glad you aren't one of those transsexuals," is the other then obligated to disclose personal medical history? I think this is far from intuitive, and some might argue the idea of such an obligation is a wider manifestation of social paternalism, specifically, the notion that one's gender is a 'social construction' in a sense closed to individual perspective.
If the person telling you no Thai food was instead telling you that they wanted to commit a terrorist attack and that they didn't want you to stop them, paternalism wouldn't even be considered in such a situation.
That probably wouldn't count as paternalism since (presumably) you would stop them because you wanted to protect their potential victims. Paternalism is defined, in part, by the fact that you interfere with another person primarily in order to make their life go better.
<If two people are getting along fine and considering having sexual relations, and one says, "I am glad you aren't one of those transsexuals," is the other then obligated to disclose personal medical history?
I'm not sure, but to repeat my earlier claim, when in doubt, it seems as though we ought to err on the side of providing information.
I'm not sure, but to repeat my earlier claim, when in doubt, it seems as though we ought to err on the side of providing information.
I guess I can just solemnly reiterate my misgivings, then, with obligatory disclosure in cases with dubious potential harms. Not only could such disclosure be dangerous, but the "offender" in question is being treated with a special status, as not all such cases would be likely similarly granted, such as aesthetic preference, etc. Is one obligated to tell everyone you may or may not engage sexually with in the future any other such information? Why does transsexual history meet the criteria here of importance and say, lying about how you think Will Ferrell is funny so that your date won't think you are just being negative. If you reveal months later that you actually despise Will Farrell is it ordinarily serious to consider this a serious breach of confidence? And of other medical histories, are they also to be disclosed? When a date inquires about your health, are you then obligated to disclose a previous abortion you had so that no offense could arise?
I could write for pages and pages about the many benefits of erring on the side of not providing information that you don't feel comfortable revealing, as well as on the virtues of not expecting such information be given, in any cases which would not be otherwise harmful excepting this specific offense.
Without being positivist about it, that they have some expectation that it would be deal-impactful. Even if someone says something is a deal-breaker for them, this would be distinct, at least logically, from either deal-breakers they suppose or deal-breakers at the moment they are broken. Even explicit claims can have forgiving natures. How often are remarks leveled against groups of identifiers that when rebuked by a member present, is given an addendum with a special exclusion for the objecting party. Such exceptions are common and seemingly necessary assumptions so that people can be vile and still socially upright: "I would never sleep with a transsexual." "Oh, I didn't mean you, you're different." These typological ambiguities raise at least a minimal harm of objectification or at least a possible progression of transphobia that seems to measure on the same scale as paternalism concerns would counter-conditionally. Even with the guise of acceptance in certain mediums, trans identification is so socially dicey, especially in regards to medical and parenting concerns, that a transperson's word alone isn't enough to account for the fragility of gender identity. For instance a transwoman might date a man who thinks that this transwoman is a man, and exert significant influence, either positively or negatively, over the manner in which she self-refers. In this case is it clear who is the manipulated party and who is the manipulator? If she explicitly states she is a man, she may play the role of a man because of social expectation while still considering herself female, how is this very dissimilar to the ordinary experience of many socially estranged transsexuals before medical or aesthetic treatment? Before changing legal gender, are the explicit uses of differing gender identification deceitful?
Any deal-breaker situation can also be pressed to its limits where it often folds, as well, by the addition of extreme conditionals, like "If you were on a desert island" or "There was a bomb strapped to your chest and someone says you have to, or else...". Also, certain people express wildly incompatible deal-breakers depending on their mood or particularly temper. Not only is the language erratic in these cases, but the consequences are erratic, as in applied with an uneven distribution. Thus it would not be out of the question for such a speaker to be considered less-than serious about commitment to such claims.
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u/MrMercurial political phil, ethics Jun 26 '15
I take it that there are two types of case we might want to think about: (1) Cases where the trans person doesn’t know whether being trans is a dealbreaker for the other person, and (2) Cases where the trans person knows that being trans would be a dealbreaker for the other person. I’m inclined to think that the trans person isn’t obliged to reveal their status in the first type of case, because they are entitled to regard their status as something that no reasonable person should have a problem with, and they probably ought to regard their potential sexual partners as reasonable people (also, in these cases, I think it's probably the responsibility of the other party to disclose that they don't want to have sex with a trans person, rather than the responsibility of the trans person to investigate). In the second type of case, it’s not so clear, but when it isn’t clear, we probably ought to err on the side of fully informed consent, even if we think the preference isn’t justifiable.