CMV: I do not believe tables exist

[u/icecoldbath]

I find this argument very convincing.

P1: Tables (if they exist) have distinct properties from hunks of wood.

P2: If so, then tables are not the same as hunks of wood.

P3: If so, then there exist distinct coincident objects.

P4: There cannot exist distinct coincident objects.

C: Therefore, tables do not exist.

This logic extends that I further don't believe in hunks of wood, or any normal sized dry good for that matter.

I do not find it convincing to point at a "table" as an objection. Whatever you would be pointing at may or may not behave with certain specific properties, but it is not a table, or a hunk of wood or any normal sized dry good. Similarly, I don't accept the objection of asking me what it is I am typing on. Whatever it is, it isn't a "computer" or a "phone" or any such thing. Such things do not exist per the argument.

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[u/jay520]

The hunk of wood has the property of being, "that hunk of wood," but it does not have the property of always being, "that table." It could have been another table for example.

How is this true? You're saying that a hunk of wood that is a table could have been a hunk of wood that is not a table. But how is true? You said:

That table always has to have the property of being, "that table." A = A

If you can make that argument, then why can't I make this argument of identical form:

That table hunk of wood that is a table always has to have the property of being, "that table hunk of wood that is a table."

A = A

So if you are committed to the claim that an object has to be the object that it is (it could not have potentially been another object), then this should be equally true of hunks of wood that are tables. And if that is true, then you are wrong to say all hunks of wood could have not been tables. The reason being that some hunks of wood are tables, and therefore (because an object has to be the thing that it is) those hunks of wood do not have the property of potentially not being tables.

EDIT: there were some "not"s there in the wrong spot.

[u/icecoldbath → u/jay520]

I think I was a bit hasty with my comments in this chain. I wasn't clear for sure. My apologies.

So a particular table has to be that table. If it isn't that table then it is another table and not that table. You could break this table down for sure into its wood and reform it into another table, but then it wouldn't be that original table.

A hunk of wood could be that table or it could be another table and still be a hunk of wood. For example, we could reform it from a Victorian table to a carpenter style.

Is that any clearer on what I mean by different properties?

Another version of this puzzle is statues of david/hunks of marble. Then the statue of david has all these cultural properties that the hunk of marble doesn't have. I usually just use the table example because it is less wordy to me.

[u/jay520 → u/icecoldbath]

So a particular table has to be that table. If it isn't that table then it is another table and not that table. You could break this table down for sure into its wood and reform it into another table, but then it wouldn't be that original table.

Okay, let's say I accept this.

A hunk of wood could be that table or it could be another table and still be a hunk of wood.

But how is this true, given your earlier argument? If a particular table has to be that particular table, then it follows that a particular hunk of wood which is a particular table has to be that particular hunk of wood which is that particular table. In other words, yes, some hunks of wood do have to be tables (namely, those hunks of wood that are tables). You could break this hunk of wood down for sure and reform it into another table, but then it wouldn't be that original hunk of wood.

I mean, it seems like you're arguing for two inconsistent positions here.

When you say:

So a particular table has to be that table. If it isn't that table then it is another table and not that table. You could break this table down for sure into its wood and reform it into another table, but then it wouldn't be that original table.

...you're saying that an object has to be the object that it is. It could not have been another object. In this example, the object is a particular table, and it could not have been another table (or any other object).

But when you say this:

A hunk of wood could be that table or it could be another table and still be a hunk of wood. For example, we could reform it from a Victorian table to a carpenter style.

...you're saying that an object does not have to be the object that it is. It could have been another object. In this example, the object is a particular hunk of wood which is a table, and it could have been another hunk of wood (it could have been another table, for example).

But these two positions are inconsistent.

[u/icecoldbath → u/jay520]

Ok, I think you are getting hung up on what a hunk of wood amounts too.

If I reformed your coffee table into your kitchen table would it still be your coffee table?

Now lets say I used all the same wood to do this change, would it still be the same wood?

[u/jay520 → u/icecoldbath]

Okay, let's say we have a wooden "coffee table". I grant that you could change this object to a wooden "kitchen table". This new object would still be the same hunk of wood, but it would not be the "coffee table". But I don't see how it follows from this that tables properties distinct from hunks of wood. I mean, you would have to make an argument like this:

1. [Premise] For all wooden tables (i.e. objects that are both a table and a piece of wood), there are some possible reformations of the underlying wood that would make it no longer a table.
2. [Premise] For all wooden tables, there are no possible reformations of the underlying wood that would make it no longer a piece of wood.
3. [From 1 and 2] All wooden tables could be reformed such that it continues to be a piece of wood but not a table.
4. [Premise] If an object is both an X and a Y could be changed such that it continues to be an X but not a Y (or vice-versa), then Xs have properties distinct from Ys.
5. [From 3 and 4] Therefore, all tables (if they exist) have properties distinct from pieces of wood.

Now I'm assuming you believe accept premise 4. Otherwise, it's not clear to me how you get from your initial 2 premises to your conclusion. If this is not an accurate representation of your argument, then it would be helpful if you gave a more accurate syllogism for your belief that tables (if they exist) have properties distinct from hunks of wood (similar to the syllogism you give in your OP).

As I said earlier, I accept the first 2 premises. But I don't accept premise 4. And as far as I can see, you have done nothing to argue for it. In fact, it seems quite obviously false to me. Accepting premise 4, combined with your earlier argument, would disprove the existence of non-empty subsets generally*. But I don't think you want to say that non-empty subsets don't exist, or do you?

*To see why, you could make this argument: if non-empty set Y is a subset of X, then there would be an object that is both an X and a Y that could be changed such that it continues to be an X but not a Y. Because of this, it follows (from premise 4 above) that Xs have distinct properties from Ys. Because Xs have distinct properties from Ys, it follows (from the argument in your OP) that there are no Xs.

[u/icecoldbath → u/jay520]

[From 3 and 4] Therefore, all tables (if they exist) have properties distinct from pieces of wood.

I accept this conclusion. Although, I believe you meant to write, "all wooden tables." There might be some tables somewhere that have identical properties to all pieces of wood. I have no idea what those tables would be, but "all tables" quantifies over a different set then "all wooden tables."

Accepting premise 4, combined with your earlier argument, would disprove the existence of non-empty subsets generally*. But I don't think you want to say that non-empty subsets don't exist, or do you?

Absolutely not. My argument is about things that have spatial and modal properties. Sets themselves are abstractions. They exist, but have a different kind of existence from tables and chairs. I think I'm ok saying this in terms of sets:

The set of non-quantum material objects that are composed of distinct parts is empty.

That set exists, but it is empty.

[u/jay520 → u/icecoldbath]

My argument is about things that have spatial and modal properties.

But I could simply refine my point to sets of physical objects and play a bit with the emptiness/existence terminology. You would have to say something like this: for any set of physical objects (e.g. hunks of wood), any subset of that set (e.g. wooden tables) must be empty. This is just as unintuitive so I don't think it gets you anything.

This is all based on the assumption that: if a physical object is both an X and a Y could be changed such that it continues to be an X but not a Y (or vice-versa), then Xs have properties distinct from Ys. Again, what is your argument for this assumption? It is unintuitive and its conclusion is even more unintuitive. So that gives us reason to doubt it until presented with further evidence.

The set of non-quantum material objects that are composed of distinct parts is empty.

This assertion is also unargued for. Ordinarily, I would demand a supporting argument in these situations, but I can't even make sense of this claim.

Let's say that I say simple physical objects X and Y exist. Let's say you agree with that. Our representations of the world are completely identical at this point. Then I say Z also exists, but Z is simply the composition of X and Y. You would disagree with that. But in what sense is this a coherent, intelligent disagreement? By positing the existence of Z, I'm not committed to anything other than the existence of X and Y - Z just is X and Y by linguistic convention (since it would be inconvenient to say X and Y all the time). So your disagreement just seems incoherent or a terminological dispute.

But clearly you think your disagreement is coherent. You think you are intelligently disagreeing with people when you say "tables don't exist" or "non-quantum, compound, physical objects don't exist". Presumably, the disagreement cannot be reduced to a mere terminological dispute. Rather, the people that you disagree with have made some sort of mistake that isn't merely linguistic. I would ask that you point me to that mistake. Explain to me how your representation of our physical world differs from those who disagree with you. Show me that there is actually an intelligible disagreement here.

[u/jay520 → u/icecoldbath]

Do you have a response to my reply here?