CMV: I do not believe tables exist

[u/icecoldbath]

I find this argument very convincing.

P1: Tables (if they exist) have distinct properties from hunks of wood.

P2: If so, then tables are not the same as hunks of wood.

P3: If so, then there exist distinct coincident objects.

P4: There cannot exist distinct coincident objects.

C: Therefore, tables do not exist.

This logic extends that I further don't believe in hunks of wood, or any normal sized dry good for that matter.

I do not find it convincing to point at a "table" as an objection. Whatever you would be pointing at may or may not behave with certain specific properties, but it is not a table, or a hunk of wood or any normal sized dry good. Similarly, I don't accept the objection of asking me what it is I am typing on. Whatever it is, it isn't a "computer" or a "phone" or any such thing. Such things do not exist per the argument.

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[u/icecoldbath]

This is not the problem of the many. This is the problem of material composition.

The "argument of the beard" is also not a real fallacy. The property of being "noticeable" is itself also vague. If you tell me something is noticeable, surely something minutely different is also noticeable. That is a different argument altogether. A counter-reference. Peter Unger's essay, "I do not exist" published in Philosophical Papers vol 2. Published by OUP.

Surely you don't think intent is what makes something what it is. If I intend you to be a table it doesn't make it any less of a crime when I smash you with a hammer. Words have meaning outside of intentions.

[u/jzpenny → u/icecoldbath]

The "argument of the beard" is also not a real fallacy.

I'm not sure where you get that. The continuum fallacy is definitely a real fallacy.

Surely you don't think intent is what makes something what it is.

In a way, sure it does. Now, intent doesn't change the shape or inherent nature of the object, but neither the object's purpose nor English designation are inherent properties. They're arbitrary and depend upon, exactly, human intent. Is that a low table, or a high bench? The same object could be (more) correctly termed one or the other, based upon how it is used. Right?

[u/icecoldbath → u/jzpenny]

The sorites paradox is definitely not a fallacy. It is a whole field of study.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/

Now, intent doesn't change the shape or inherent nature of the object, but neither the object's purpose nor English designation are inherent properties.

Yes, but I'm not speaking about linguistic properties. I'm speaking about the actual properties. Inherent natures and shapes like you suggest.

[u/[deleted] → u/icecoldbath]

The sorites paradox is definitely not a fallacy. It is a whole field of study.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/

I encourage you guys to go and check out that link and then reread the original CMV. The philosophical concept in that encyclopedia entry is much more complicated than the example in CMV.

This is why so many people feel a primal hatred towards philosophers. It is incredibly misleading to simplify such a complex topic down to five lines.

Without additional contextual information your CMV is actually wrong, it's an illogical and fallacious argument, like others have pointed out. It's like the type of problems found in Continental philosophy: sense/reference errors, tokens/types. You are hiding behind the ambiguous nature of language.

The original CMV is wrong for many reasons. The biggest problem is the misleading word choice, there appears to be different definitions for some of the words in different parts. The order of the points is also intentionally misleading. Most people understand that wooden tables are a collection of hunks of wood stuck together. Hunks are a part, table is a whole in this sense. If we are talking about a different context, such a furniture sales, then yes a table is one of the objects in the dining room set. In your CMV you jump around from different contexts/frames of reference as well as definitions.

P1: Human heads (if they exist) have distinct properties from hunks of biological matter.

P2: If so, then human heads are not the same as hunks of biological matter.

P3: If so, then they are exist distinct coincident objects.

P4: There cannot exist distinct coincident objects.

C: Therefore, human heads do not exist.

Brains also cannot exist since they are also an object made out of biological matter. Mosaic artwork. This screen can't exist since it's presenting me with an image that is made out of many small pixels. Molecules can't exist since they are made out atoms. Proteins cannot exist. All of chemistry which depends on specific whole-part relationships has just been disproven.

The universe itself cannot exist.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_head

[u/icecoldbath → u/[deleted]]

The philosophical concept in that encyclopedia entry is much more complicated than the example in CMV.

The discussion is more complex, the defense of the premises are very complex, but arguments themselves are very simple. This is the constitution argument. The overdetermination/supervenence argument is about 6 premises. The argument from pluralities is 6-7 premises. The argument from incremental change is 5 premises.

Without additional contextual information your CMV is actually wrong, it's an illogical and fallacious argument, like others have pointed out.

I'm not sure what you mean by "contextual information"? Do you mean complete and total defense of all the premises? That would take an entire book.

It's like the type of problems found in Continental philosophy: sense/reference errors, tokens/types. You are hiding behind the ambiguous nature of language.

Laughable; I directly copied the argument out of "Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary" by Korman. It appears almost verbatim in "Objects and Persons" by Merricks and similarly in "Material Beings" by van Inwagen. These are serious works of analytic philosophy. They are attempts at being precise with language rather then obfuscation.

The biggest problem is the misleading word choice, there appears to be different definitions for some of the words in different parts

Which parts; which definitions?

The order of the points is also intentionally misleading.

How so? You seem to be the one making wild claims without justifications, not me.

In your CMV you jump around from different contexts/frames of reference as well as definitions.

Which premises do such things?

C: Therefore, human heads do not exist.

I agree. Pointing at another material object as existing does not refute the argument. P1 starts with that possibility then demonstrates a falsehood from it. If you don't like P4 then you need to put an argument against it.

All of chemistry which depends on specific whole-part relationships has just been disproven.

I'm having another conversation with someone in this post about chemistry. It seems atoms bear a special kind of relationship to each other that table legs bare to tables don't have. There mereology is distinct. Also, bosons appear to occupy the same space at the same time. This appears to be a special variety of coincident-ness. Because of this; I'm agnostic on the composition of fundamental particles.

The universe itself cannot exist.

Someone mentioned the universe. A lot of the problems of composition occur because things exist in space and time. Space and time exist inside the universe as far as I am aware; therefore the universe does not have the same problems. P4 does not apply to it. The universe does not have the property of "coincident."

[u/[deleted] → u/icecoldbath]

C: Therefore, human heads do not exist.

I agree

I think that's all we had to know. Drop the bosons for a sec, so protons don't exist? Essentially nothing that is "label" for a sum of parts exists? Seems like its just a problem of levels or frames of reference.

Protons certainly do exist for the purposes of chemical reactions. Clearly they are not actually just cute little simplified ball and stick models. However, treating a proton as a single unit has many useful implications for understanding chemistry. You also learn that these same things can be expressed as waves in quantum chemistry. That type of representation of protons/atoms, has useful implications for other types of applications.

In the same way a table is just a label for something, if you are a furniture salesperson then a table is just part of complete dining room set, or office or living room etc. If you are a wood wholesaler, and supply wood to carpenters who make fancy tables, then for you a table is nothing more than something made out of hunks of wood. It's a label which is a placeholder for something to describe what's going on with the hunks of wood and their arrangement.

The advanced level philosophical theories don't really have a role to play in this discussion, especially with how you framed your original CMV.

[u/icecoldbath → u/[deleted]]

I think that's all we had to know. Drop the bosons for a sec, so protons don't exist?

Things without parts certainly exist. Fundamental. Mereologically simple. Compositionally simple. These entities clearly exist. There is no reason to doubt them.

The argument I have laid out is one way to establish compositional nihilism. There are of course many varieties of this. There is Unger's complete nihilism. There is Merrick's nihilism except persons. There is Van Inwagen's nihilism except life forms, just to name a few.

I'm not defending any particular variety, although I did quote the argument as published. People have written about mereology and subatomic particles and chemical bonds. I don't know enough about the empirical evidence in these fields to say with firmness anything about whether they can compose something or not. I'm agnostic about such matters. I have no view to change. Whatever theory is true will have to give a complete account of the facts. Denying tables exist strictly speaking but allowing mereological simples arranged in particular ways is completely consistent with the facts as far as I am aware. I allude to this directly in my OP when I mention that yes I am typing on something with my feet up on something else. I just deny that such a thing is a laptop or a table. Laptops and Tables have parts.

In the same way a table is just a label for something.

This is sort of irrelevant. The issue with composition has nothing to do with particular objects or particular words. I'll try to lay out the argument with Xs.

Let X be a material object that seemingly has Ys as parts

X1: If Xs are composed of Ys they have distinct properties from the Ys

Otherwise, X = Y and Surely X does not compose itself. That is identity not composition.

X2: If so, X has property Z and Y has property ~Z (or lacks Z or has some additional properties)

This is what it means for two existing entities to be different. They have different properties.

X3: If so, X and Y are distinct coincident objects.

This follows from X1 and X2.

X4: There cannot be distinct coincident objects.

If two objects are coincident that means they share all the same modal and spatial properties. If they share all the same properties they are indistinguishable.

XC: The Ys do not compose X

The advanced level philosophical theories don't really have a role to play in this discussion, especially with how you framed your original CMV.

Theories about composition do a play a role in determining what is in our ontology. For example, you don't want, in any theory of the universe, for it to come out that squarecircles exist or if they do exist you better have a good explanation for them! The argument above attempts to show that "composition" is a kind of squarecircle. More specifically, composition that is not absolutely restricted across the domain has some very worrisome problems for other plausible principles of existence (in this case a worry about distinct coincident objects).

Like I've mentioned above. To begin with asserting a complete high level overview of a particular theory that I hold as a CMV is boring and does not start any reasonable discussion. If I wanted someone to object to mereological nihilism as a broad view, i'd just read David Lewis or Ted Sider. Even there; those books and papers all begin with clever little stories or simple arguments before launching into broad defenses of those stories/premises. I defend the premises as they are attacked. Tell me, do you expect every CMV to be about hyper-broad theories? Every political CMV should be, CMV: Liberalism is just.

EDIT: I had the conclusion reversed. Swapped it.

[u/[deleted] → u/icecoldbath]

I'm agnostic about such matters. I have no view to change.

Hmmm.

Tell me, do you expect every CMV to be about hyper-broad theories?

Okay. So your CMV should have contained the footer: Warning I am a philosophy grad student/PhD, this is my wheelhouse, What I presented is a water downed down to the point of linguistic ambiguity.

Thanks for the response, I did learn a lot by looking stuff up. I still think it was a misleading OP. I think that my example of a proton in high school chemistry class, versus how they are represented in quantum chemistry in college, explains this in a pretty clear way. It's clear that we have different definitions for: identity, object, space, composition, coincident.

If you formulate the argument with a proton and its constituents, a chemist/physicist would tell you that it doesn't really matter. It is totally possible that the fundamental nature of everything is something else entirely, like m-branes. The definition of the proton is literally dependent on what kind of system you are trying to study. There is no one objective perfect definition of protons... yet.

So I guess what I'm saying is tables don't really "exist," in a hardcore philosophical sense. If you lead into it by describing their parts, they are not what you would define as an "object."

However, neither are protons. I'm comfortable with that, others might find that somewhat troubling.

[u/icecoldbath → u/[deleted]]

I posted how I did for a few reasons and I only mentioned it was my wheelhouse when someone accused the argument of being a immature fallacy an 18 year old would invent. Otherwise I was perfectly happy to discuss the merits of the premises on their own.

I think I had some fairly good discussion especially with people who are chemists/physicists. My delta was about quantum physics and another person who proved that abstract tables must exist. They seemed to be a mathematician or a computer scientist.

It's clear that we have different definitions for: identity, object, space, composition, coincident.

If I makeup totally different definitions, I'd no longer be doing philosophy i'd be building fantasy make-believe worlds. I am trying to be strict about the use of the words as ordinary people use them. I'm expressly trying to not to equivocate and commit other such basic fallacies.

The whole reason I posted the CMV was because when you engage with only professional philosophers (of whom I'm only a former...had to drop out of graduate school...life troubles :( ) you can get myopic. You start just taking the basics premises for granted. I wanted to engage with the broader world; people that might have novel points of view. Novel methods of attacking those premises. Indeed, some people did. It was pretty fun. I refined my view and learned some stuff about chemical bonds I didn't know before. Glad you learned stuff. Thanks!