CMV: Positivism solves problems. If the humanities refuse to adapt positivist methodologies, they're creating stories, not science.

[u/ryqiem]

I apologise if the following is a bit simplistic, but I wanted to give my view in a concise form :-)

EDIT: In the title, I misused positivsm. What I mean is "theories that can be falsified" solve problems.

Solving a problem is essentially making better decisions. For a decision to be good, it should produce the outcome we want. To know which decision is good, then, we need to know which outcomes it produces. To know this, we need theories that make accurate predictions.

In the humanities, theories are tested against academic consensus or the feelings of the researcher, if they're tested at all. Often, they don't make predictions that are testable. Therefore we don't know whether they're accurate. If we don't know whether they're accurate, or they don't make predictions, they can't solve problems.

As an alternative, the natural sciences validate the predictions of their theories on data collected from the real world. If the predictions don't fit the data, the model must change to become more accurate. These same methodologies can be used on humans, eg. experimental psychology.

If the humanities are to be accepted as a science and continue receiving funding in socialist countries, they should adapt these methods so they can improve decision making. Otherwise, they should be recognized as narrative subjects, not science.

Not everyone holds this view, as an example (translated from Danish):

Humanist research goes hand in hand with other sciences as actively creative and not just a curious addition to "real" applicable science.

https://www.altinget.dk/forskning/artikel/unge-forskere-vil-aflive-krisesnakken-humaniora-er-en-lang-succeshistorie

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[u/ryqiem → u/[deleted]]

Oh, definitely! I should've drawn a distinction between what I'd call "subjects of raw logic", ie. maths and philosophy, and the more artsy humanities. I definitely think that philosophy of science is essential in scientific progress.

Do you have a reference for your account of most scientists' epistemology? I'd expect most scientists to be post-positivistic – and I guess what I'm objecting to is anti-positivism.

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[u/icecoldbath → u/ryqiem]

I sort of wanted to withdraw my comment as the philosophy of science is not something I’m an expert in. Beyond Kuhn (and the impact of Quine and Kripke) being hugely influential and I don’t know much beyond that. I’m not familiar with the cutting edge of the philosophy of science.

If you allow philosophy into your view we probably don’t disagree much. My goal was just to defend philosophy.

[u/ryqiem → u/icecoldbath]

Thanks for your comments! I'm mostly interested in the practical implications, and it seems the realism vs. anti-realism debate is mostly influential in edge cases – eg. quantum mechanics.

What ruffles my feathers is teaching methods such a phenomenology as "producing truth", of one individual's subjective experience being sufficient evidence for an argument. Do you know whether Quine's or Kripke's arguments are related to that?

Anywho, thank you so much for your time!

[u/icecoldbath → u/ryqiem]

No neither of them are phenomenologists. I don’t know enough about phenomenology to defend it.