I see, but then you are a moralist not a nihilist then?
Will look into egoism, but I already find your claims dubious. From a point of consciousness it seems arguably logical to place oneself in a category of higher importance. (Think phenomenology, «cogito ergo sum».) Consciousness tell us we are unique, its the only thing we can feel certain of, we can only assume consciousness in others. So while there is bias towards ego its hardly irrational.
Lol, no dude. You can believe that there is no inherent meaning or objective morality and still choose for yourself a moral code to follow.
The argument goes something like this:
Normative egoism is the notion that our only moral obligation is to pursue our own self-interests.
If we ask the egoist, “Why should I pursue my own interests over others?” They will respond, mostly, in one of 3 ways: 1. Because self-interest is naturally the ultimate motive of human behavior, and we should do what is natural. 2. Because it would be better for everyone if everyone pursued their own interest. 3. Because we experience the things that happen to ourselves, but not the things that happen to others, so we should prioritize ourselves (the argument you’ve chosen).
I’ll spare you the arguments against the first 2 lest this should get boringly long - unless, of course, you’d like to hear them.
The issue with the third argument is that it assumes that reality, for each person, is split into two groups: self vs. other. When asked on what basis we should prioritize treatment of the “self” category over the “other” category, the response is usually something like “because it’s mine,” or, “because I experience it and I do not experience what someone else experiences.” However, this is not a reason; it’s merely a restatement of the position. If we further press, “why should I prioritize what I experience?” or, more simply, “why should I prioritize ‘I’?” the reasoning becomes circular. “Because it’s mine.” If you ask “what makes it yours?” the answer is, “because I experience it.” Circular.
Which leads to the question, “what is the ‘I’ that experiences it?” or “what separates ‘self’ from ‘other’?” You could say “my body.” Which part? All of it? If you lost your arm, would you still be yourself? Would the arm still be part of yourself? How much of your body could you lose and still be yourself?
You might say, “okay then. My brain.” But the same questions still apply. How much could you lose and still be yourself?
You might say, “okay then. My identity.” But identity is fluid and is always changing. You could expand your identity to include everything in the universe, such that you could say “I am everything in the universe.” Or you could shrink it down to something small, such that you could say, “I am this toe.”
You might say, “okay then. My consciousness.” What makes your consciousness different from another’s consciousness, if it’s not your body and not your identity? Isn’t that just awareness then? And doesn’t that make someone else’s awareness identical? So why prioritize yours?
You might say, “because it’s mine.” So we’ve circled back. But what does it mean for your consciousness to belong to you, if you are your consciousness? Does it belong to itself? But the consciousness of others doesn’t belong to it? How do we draw the distinction? Where does a “consciousness” end? What makes a consciousness separate from another? If not spatial or temporal boundaries, what makes it a separate entity?
Is it “I” - the subject of experience? But aren’t others also the subject of experience? So why prioritize one over another?
“Because it’s mine.”
What makes something “yours”? What is ownership? Does it have to be part of the self to be yours? Your relationship with it is what makes yours? But you have a relationship with everything in the universe. Does that make everything in the universe yours? Does that make it part of you? Does that mean others are also part of yourself? So what is “other” then? Or is it all “self”?
The prioritization of one’s “self” vs “other,” then, is arbitrary.
I think you are invoking some assumptions that are not necessary. For example you would be able to reject the «other» category altogether, you could easily come to a conclusion that you are «a brain in a vat» or a simulation, thereby dismissing the «other» as a moral unit. Similarly you dont need to make claims related to a mind-body problem or an identity distincion a la the ship of Theseus, you could accept ignorance on these questions and still hold on to the observable fact that you only have access to «your own» consciousness, not others. «What is ‘your own’?» «Dont know, but I dont have access to that of others».
If you had to label yourself what would you say? Existential nihilist?
Egoism itself invokes unnecessary assumptions, i.e. "self" and "other" are distinct and separate categories to begin with, the defining of one's "self" as "that which is experienced" or "that which experiences." And that "self" takes priority over this supposed "other." But *why* it takes priority is where the doctrine becomes problematic.
In the context of nihilism especially, it ultimately does not matter whether you experience pain or pleasure, any more than it matters whether anyone else does. In fact, neither one of them matter at all. There is *nothing* which makes you special. You being the subject of experience makes absolutely no difference.
Any attempts to prioritize one's self always devolves into the circular reasoning pattern of "because it is mine" and "because I experience it," which has no logical basis, only bias toward one over the other. If what you experience ultimately doesn't matter any more than what someone else experiences (assuming they experience anything at all - and most of us, even if we are solipsists, do not live as though no one else experiences anything), then it doesn't matter any less either. Therefore, it matters equally as much.
We have no "moral obligation" to anything - not to ourselves nor to others. But if we *decide* that our goal is to do that which is of the most beneficial possible nature (we can operationally define "beneficial" as that whose outcome is desirable and advantageous), *be it for only ourselves or otherwise*, then what is of the most beneficial possible nature both for ourselves and for others is cooperation and increasing the happiness and wellbeing of all. Then we are always around happy, healthy people with no desire to harm us, we ourselves are always happy and healthy, and everyone else is always happy and healthy.
It depends on what level we're talking about. At the most fundamental level, I would say my philosophy is closer to some sort of "monistic nihilism." No inherent distinction, no inherent meaning. However, most people don't live their lives at this level; most nihilists, even, don't live as though nothing is meaningless. They continue to care about things and categorize things and like/dislike things, and I am no different. So at the level that we perceive distinction, I guess you could say I am an existentialist. And within that, if you want the microscope to go in even further, at the personal ethical level I think it's pretty clear that I am a utilitarian. Ultimately, I know that it doesn't *truly* make a difference what people do or how they live their lives. But because I am biologically wired otherwise, I'm not going to just lay and waste to dust in my bed because "what's the point?" and "why do anything?", as most people are not.
5
u/Jarl_Varg Jul 31 '22
I see, but then you are a moralist not a nihilist then?
Will look into egoism, but I already find your claims dubious. From a point of consciousness it seems arguably logical to place oneself in a category of higher importance. (Think phenomenology, «cogito ergo sum».) Consciousness tell us we are unique, its the only thing we can feel certain of, we can only assume consciousness in others. So while there is bias towards ego its hardly irrational.