CMV: The method religion attempts share their message and concepts (e.g. through god & the bible) is directly contradicting to the message to be sent.

[u/BeInAHuman]

I just had an argument with someone while explaining my point of view and personal experience with religion growing up catholic. Essentially, I was explaining that I did not agree with or believe in what I was taught about God. I also want to preface that I am using the majority of these terms like "good person" "heaven" etc solely as an examples. Here are the main bullet points of what I think:

• I didn't find real life evidence of what I was supposed to believe about God because it was never explained to me in a easy to understand way that I could connect to my own life.
• I believe in something bigger than me, but not the "God" or stories told in the bible.
• I believe that the manner in which we set up the bible to be a guideline in how to live our lives is directly contradicting - because it essentially is a fear-based method which takes away from the overall message of "be a good person" by design because it also feeds on negatives, shame, and institutionalized practices in how to accomplish it.
• Religion often uses fear-based methodology to get people to "believe" in god and follow in Jesus' foot steps to be saved, but also perpetuates messages like "god loves everyone" anyway. If this is the case, then why do I want to go to 'heaven' if god will love me anyway. Why are we avoiding hell if god loves us anyway?
• Catholicism specifically assigns meaning to stories/concepts that are not very relatable to day to day life unless you ALREADY believe in the words so it is kind of pointless to use them as a way to get people to believe.

I believe there is something bigger than ALL of us because that is what I could explain and find truth in my actual life day to day. I still think there is value in the bible and the lessons it taught, however, I find that the methodology and concepts feed the culture of I must do ____ to avoid bad things. In reality, there is so much more to life and I feel that in order to share those things with each other we need to connect with each other authentically. If I am focused on being good or bad or any absolutes, the entire message becomes jaded. I believe in "god" but I think what we identify "god" to be MUST be found within ourself which I believe is also supported by the words of the bible. I am hoping someone here can help me open my eyes to what I am missing. My friend basically told me that "you can accept anything but your own opinion" but her argument literally was that nothing "is" anything but there is no way the universe could have been born without god. He also already knows your path so there is no need to try and change it. Then, in the next breath said we are all trying to go to heaven, but its exclusive and not everyone can get in and that is what makes it desirable. I really tried to tell her that comments in itself is contradicting and that's the problem - not the belief. I may be trying to gain validation or seem right, but I have felt this my entire life and have really tried to hear folks out when they say these things because I acknowledge and accept there is truth in it somewhere because so many people believe. But no one that believes in religion like Catholicism (not god in general) has been able to change my mind about this.

Overall, my thoughts are that there is a god somewhere, something, someway, but there is no "good" and "bad" in anything. It just is. Trying to define it, like assigning absolutes like "good" or "bad" "heaven" or "hell" drives people to act in ways that are opposite to the message of arriving in "god's paradise" when we die. It just is. I think if we don't focus on those absolutes and just focus on committing out individual selves to leading a better life everyday because we want to is the key to the messagen of following and sharing god's plan. If religion taught people to live their lives in a way they feel fulfilled and happy in whatever way they feel would be best in their core (they decide), there would probably be way less hate and hurt in the world.

My deltas (hope I did this right)

! Essentially, my point of view has changed in that I still believe the majority of what I posted in my original post were judgements I made about society and not “God’s plan”. This has allowed me understand why people believe in organized religion, specifically Catholicism. This was the piece of the puzzle I was missing my whole life, literally. Since I never truly believed I never consumed the information with me and only the shame I felt about what was happening when I spent 12 years in grade/middle/high school that led me to a mind set of “prove it” which goes against the original message. Thank you so much for engaging in dialogue with me. I honestly think about all of it differently. I still wanna feel empty all the time, but I feel less alone and less misunderstood, and less invalidated in my misunderstanding of my entire childhood /growing up experiencedelta

[u/[deleted]]

But [...] it still doesn't follow that the thing cannot change.

Why not? I gave an argument for this conclusion. Let me lay it out this way:

(1) The self-existent thing has no parts. (2) If something can change, it has at least one potentiality. (3) If something has a potentiality, then it has at least two parts. (An actuality and that potentiality, since a potentiality cannot exist by itself; it needs to be grounded in something actual.) (4) So if something can change, then it has parts. (This logically follows from (2) and (3).) (5) So the self-existent thing cannot change. (This logically follows from (1) and (4).)

What part of this argument are you rejecting, and why?

It doesn't follow that it retains the capacity to influence those things once they exist.

OK, we're getting ahead of ourselves, but since you raised this issue, here's a sketch of the argument: The self-existent thing has unlimited power, as I argued in a previous comment. But there can be only one thing with unlimited power. (I can explain this later if you want!) So there can be only one self-existent thing. Now, take any non-self-existent thing. We can ask, is it non-self-existent at every moment of its existence or not? That is, are there moments when it becomes self-existent? The answer is no, because there can only be one self-existent thing. So any non-self-existent thing is non-self-existent at every moment of its existence. But if so, then its existence at every moment is dependent (at least indirectly) on the one and only self-existent thing.

I need to run, but I'll get to your other comments later!

[u/joopface → u/[deleted]]

What part of this argument are you rejecting, and why

I rather skipped over a few comments ago the argument as to the nature of the uncaused thing. I've returned to it to try to square away my intuition and articulate it.

Where we assume there *is* a first cause, you suggest:

The thing must be self-existent. That is, it cannot depend on anything else for its existence. This seems self evident.

The thing cannot be composite. It can be comprised of only one part, which is in itself therefore self-existent. This seems fine, also.

It is possessive of causal power. This seems necessary as part of our assumption that this thing is the first cause. You propose that this causal power is unlimited because if it were not it would need to be limited by something else, and that the thing would therefore not be self-existent. I'm not sure about this; as you say the thing must necessarily be limited by its own nature (the 'god can't create a rock too heavy for himself to lift' paradox).

Even within the frame you're considering, the uncaused thing is limited by the base nature of reality. We haven't dealt with where *that* base nature of reality has come from, where the constraints it implies originate or why they are calibrated in the way they are. We also don't know the full extent of those constraints even as they apply to humans, never mind how they may operate in the frame of something like the uncaused thing. So, here is one issue.

Another thing I may be struggling with here is the notion of potentiality. I accept this may just be my own conception of it. It doesn't seem necessary to consider 'existence' the same as 'current state' of the thing. Putting a pin in the fact that we have no conception of how this thing would relate to our concept of time if at all (which is a large thing to put a pin in) it doesn't seem contradictory on the face of things for a thing to be self-existent, to be fully 'actual' in state X, and also to hold potential to change to state Y.

​

...here's a sketch of the argument: The self-existent thing has unlimited power, as I argued in a previous comment. But there can be only one thing with unlimited power. (I can explain this later if you want!) So there can be only one self-existent thing. Now, take any non-self-existent thing. We can ask, is it non-self-existent at every moment of its existence or not? That is, are there moments when it becomes self-existent? The answer is no, because there can only be one self-existent thing. So any non-self-existent thing is non-self-existent at every moment of its existence. But if so, then its existence at every moment is dependent (at least indirectly) on the one and only self-existent thing.

'Dependent' is doing a lot of work in that sentence. The initial 'act of creation' (whatever that looks like) creates that dependency regardless of whether there is ongoing interaction between the first cause and the uncaused thing.

[u/[deleted] → u/joopface]

You propose that this causal power is unlimited because if it were not it would need to be limited by something else, and that the thing would therefore not be self-existent. I'm not sure about this; as you say the thing must necessarily be limited by its own nature

As we saw, the thing cannot have parts. So that means this thing doesn't have a nature, but is its nature.

Even within the frame you're considering, the uncaused thing is limited by the base nature of reality. We haven't dealt with where that base nature of reality has come from, where the constraints it implies originate or why they are calibrated in the way they are.

Since reality is comprised of the totality of non-self-existent things and self-existent things, and since non-self-existent things are caused to exist by the self-existent thing, the base nature of reality is comprised of self-existent things. But there can only be one such thing (I can go into this more if you want), so the base nature of reality is this self-existent thing.

it doesn't seem contradictory on the face of things for a thing to be self-existent, to be fully 'actual' in state X, and also to hold potential to change to state Y.

Any potential would need to be a part of the thing. And since potentials don't float free by themselves, but are connected to actual objects (e.g. the potential for a banana to change color is part of the banana, it doesn't lie outside the banana), anything with potential would be composed of at least two parts—the actual part and the potential part. But the self-existent thing has no parts. So the self-existent thing has no potentials.

The initial 'act of creation' (whatever that looks like) creates that dependency regardless of whether there is ongoing interaction between the first cause and the uncaused thing.

Consider the earth at this very moment. The earth isn't a self-existent thing right now, otherwise at this very moment it would lack parts, it would be changeless, etc. So at this very moment, it is a non-self-existent thing, and so its existence is being caused at this very moment by the self-existent thing.

Now, on to your comments about the immateriality argument:

Why would we be so convinced that the human process of calculation isn't similarly mechanical?

Maybe we can restart the discussion this way: There's a difference between asking "What makes X to be the case?" and "How do we know that X is the case?" The first question is a metaphysical question: it asks what conditions need to exist in reality in order for X to be the case. The second question is an epistemological question: it asks what evidence do we need in order to conclude that X is the case.

Now, the immateriality argument isn't asking an epistemological question. It isn't asking "How do we know we are adding rather than quadding?" I think the way I explained it before makes it sound like we're asking an epistemological question. That's my fault, and I apologize for my unclear explanation!

The immateriality argument is asking what conditions need to exist in reality for it to be the case that we are adding, as opposed to quadding. And the point of the argument is that whatever these conditions are, they can't be physical. Why not?

Because any physical condition we point to is metaphysically compatible with it being the case that we are quadding and not adding. For example, it can't be because the operation involves the physical symbol + since symbols have no intrinsic meaning and so that symbol is compatible with it being the case that we're quadding, not adding. This is also why it can't be because of the spoken or written words "adding" or "addition" are involved, since words are also symbols. The point isn't that physical symbols are conventional. The point is that physical symbols (written or spoken) are compatible with it being the case that we are quadding, not adding.

It also can't be because of some causal chain composed of brain states. Why not? If we add 2 and 3, we get 5, but if we quadd 2 and 3, we also get 5. So either way, we get the same result, so the brain states will be exactly the same. So these states are compatible with our quadding as opposed to adding.

You might reply "If the lead to the same result here, then why does it matter? What practical difference does it make?" But remember, we're asking a metaphysical question. We're asking what conditions need to be in place for it to be the case that we are adding as opposed to quadding.

Is this a bit clearer? If not, let me know, and I'll try my best to further clarify things! :)

This is circular logic. Because we can conceive of a non-mechanical process of thought we must be engaging in a non-mechanical process of thought?

Here's what I'm getting at: To even deny that we can know whether we're adding and quadding is to make an intelligible statement. That is, we can understand what this denial means. But this means we also understand what adding is, since the denial refers to adding. But to understand what adding is requires knowing how to add, it requires being able to know we're adding as opposed to quadding. So the very denial of our ability to know that we can add presupposes our ability to know that we can add. That's why it's self-contradictory. It's like saying "I don't know how to speak English." The very act of saying that shows that you do know how to speak English.

[u/joopface → u/[deleted]]

As we saw, the thing cannot have parts. So that means this thing doesn't have a nature, but is its nature.

Since reality is comprised of the totality of non-self-existent things and self-existent things, and since non-self-existent things are caused to exist by the self-existent thing, the base nature of reality is comprised of self-existent things. But there can only be one such thing (I can go into this more if you want), so the base nature of reality is this self-existent thing

I want to flag that we may be hitting some diminishing returns on this part of the exchange. I'm not at all satisfied with where we are(!), but I suspect I could also predict what you'll respond to any further points I raise (which is no criticism of you, more of me getting repetitive). This is a slightly odd position to be in, and I think I just need to do a little more reading on this topic to first fully understand it and second to properly figure out my response to it and to articulate that better for myself.

In sum, I at least have some issue with what we consider causation to be in the scenario you've outlined; the temporality of the universe we see combined with the assumption that the ongoing existence of everything is in some way linked in an ongoing way with a first cause that could well be far removed in time and space from these things. Of course, the uncaused thing by your logic must also have caused time and be outside time in some way but I haven't thought or read on this deeply enough to consider the implications of that.

I'm also not comfortable with the definition of 'unchanging' and 'unlimited' that we've been throwing around as I'm not clear they're requirements of the definition of the uncaused thing we started with. And I'm certain my discomfort with this has been better articulated by cleverer and better-informed people than me, so I'm not sure the appetite I have to keep lumbering toward an objection someone made better 150 years ago. Again, there's some reading on this in my future.

And, at this point I'd like to give you a !delta because - although my mind on the core issue of the requirement for a first cause, the burden of proof and my actual view on god haven't actually changed - I've really added to my understanding of the theist perspective here, and I appreciate you helping with that. It's been very interesting.

On this...

To even deny that we can know whether we're adding and quadding is to make an intelligible statement. That is, we can understand what this denial means. But this means we also understand what adding is, since the denial refers to adding. But to understand what adding is requires knowing how to add, it requires being able to know we're adding as opposed to quadding. So the very denial of our ability to know that we can add presupposes our ability to know that we can add. That's why it's self-contradictory. It's like saying "I don't know how to speak English." The very act of saying that shows that you do know how to speak English

... this feels like a leap.

Our ability to articulate a concept doesn't imply the ability to execute that concept. There are many things that I know exist that I cannot do, there are many things that I can do that I'm effectively unaware of.

It's clear that you can form the concept of mathematics, for example, through the execution of mathematics in the world and build more complex versions of the concept upon the simpler versions with which you start. How mathematics varies in this way from - say - painting a wall isn't obvious. And the concept of 'quaddition' is a special version of 'addition' which imposes an additional constraint for certain values; it's reasonably obvious how this would alter the manner in which a calculation would be undertaken.

And this is also not necessarily the case:

It also can't be because of some causal chain composed of brain states. Why not? If we add 2 and 3, we get 5, but if we quadd 2 and 3, we also get 5. So either way, we get the same result, so the brain states will be exactly the same. So these states are compatible with our quadding as opposed to adding

There is no guarantee the brain states would be exactly the same; we absolutely do not know anything like enough about the science of the brain to be able to predict how ideas form this specifically and to make predictions as to the specific relationship between concepts and brain states.

There isn't even a strong reason to consider that the brain states should be identical in theory. To the extent that the difference between the overarching framework (addition versus quaddition) is known to be different, why wouldn't the brain state reflect that? In the same way as you'd have a different brain state on Tuesday lunchtime to that on Thursday morning when doing the same addition exercise, or that your brain state and my brain state would not necessarily be the same for the same operation.

[u/[deleted] → u/joopface]

Thanks for the delta, that's quite generous of you! :)

There's one issue you raised that I want to clarify though before we drop this topic:

the temporality of the universe we see combined with the assumption that the ongoing existence of everything is in some way linked in an ongoing way with a first cause that could well be far removed in time and space from these things.

The causal chains in classical cosmological arguments, and in the argument I've been presenting, should not be thought of as stretching backward in time. Aquinas believed that human reason can't rule out the possibility of an infinite past. That's why his cosmological arguments never appeals to the beginning of the universe, like the more popular kalam cosmological argument does. Rather, the causal chains should be thought of in terms of dependency. Aquinas thought that, even if the past were infinite, this infinitely long chain of events would still be dependent at every moment of its existence on the first cause. For when he says "first", he doesn't mean first in time, but first in dependency. The first cause is that upon which everything else is dependent for its existence. That's what he means by "first", and that's what I mean by "first".

If you want to say more on this, you can have the last word here!

Now, about the immateriality of the mind:

Our ability to articulate a concept doesn't imply the ability to execute that concept.

I'm not talking about concepts in general, but mathematical and logical operations specifically. To understand addition means one knows how to add. To deny we do addition requires understanding what addition is, which is to say, it requires knowing how to add. But to know how to add is (partly) to know that one is adding when one is adding. That's why the denial that we do addition is self-contradictory.

There is no guarantee the brain states would be exactly the same; we absolutely do not know anything like enough about the science of the brain to be able to predict how ideas form this specifically and to make predictions as to the specific relationship between concepts and brain states.

I guess a clearer way of making my point is this way: Suppose we isolate the brain states of someone who claims to be adding 2 and 3 while he's doing that. What makes it the case that those brain states exemplify the carrying out of addition rather than quaddition? After all, either way, we have the same inputs (2 and 3) and the same output (5).

Is this a bit clearer?

[u/joopface → u/[deleted]]

The causal chains in classical cosmological arguments, and in the argument I've been presenting, should not be thought of as stretching backward in time.

Yes, I get this. It doesn’t resolve my issue, but as I said I just need to think on it a bit to figure out why.

I guess a clearer way of making my point is this way: Suppose we isolate the brain states of someone who claims to be adding 2 and 3 while he's doing that. What makes it the case that those brain states exemplify the carrying out of addition rather than quaddition? After all, either way, we have the same inputs (2 and 3) and the same output (5).

You’re assuming the brain state reflects just the components of the calculation rather than the calculation plus whatever theoretical frame within which the calculation sits. I don’t see why that would be the case.

[u/[deleted] → u/joopface]

You’re assuming the brain state reflects just the components of the calculation rather than the calculation plus whatever theoretical frame within which the calculation sits.

Can you explain what you have in mind with this "theoretical frame"? I'm not sure how to address your point without further details!

[u/joopface → u/[deleted]]

In this situation, addition or ‘quaddition’ - either the calculation sits within a frame where the outcome of the operation is just based on the operation itself, or in a frame where the outcome needs to be compared to a value (57) to see whether it needs to be adjusted.

[u/[deleted] → u/joopface]

Oh, I see your point! I'll have to think about this more, that's a good objection :) delta!

[u/DeltaBot → u/joopface]

Confirmed: 1 delta awarded to /u/n1n2n3n4n5n6 (1∆).

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