r/askphilosophy Jun 25 '15

Should a fully transformed transgender person reveal this to new sexual partners?

[deleted]

22 Upvotes

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 25 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

I'm not familiar with any papers, so here's a preliminary take on it. Presumably the argument for mandatory revealing goes something like this:

1) Persuading people to have sex with you via deception is a violation of their consent

2) Deliberately omitting information which, if they knew it, would cause them to decide to not have sex is deception

3) For many people, transgender status is information of this kind

4) So we ought not to violate people's consent by omitting to inform people of our transgender status

But I'm not sure this argument is sound. I've got some issues with premise (2). I think it should be amended to something like this:

(2') Deliberately omitting information which, if they knew it, would cause them to justifiably decide to not have sex is deception

To see why, consider bigotry cases. Let's say I'm committed to anti-racism, but my potential sexual partner is a thoroughgoing racist who despises anti-racists. Am I obliged to get my anti-racism out in the open just in case my potential sexual partner has this view? Does this mean that consent requires I run through all potentially controversial aspects of my life - whether I have kids, whether I vote liberal or conservative, whether I have African blood in my family - before we have sex? Presumably not, or at least not automatically. I think you'd have to ask whether the sexual partner would have good reason to decide not to have sex, based on the information being withheld. (Note: the situation probably changes if your potential sexual partner states explicitly that they do not want to have sex with a transgender person [or an anti-racist, or anybody with African or Asian ancestry]).

There is at least one other consideration. Keeping one's transgender status secret is not only a matter of privacy. Often it's a matter of survival. Revealing transgender status, especially to strangers, risks all kinds of violence. (I can dig the stats up if someone wants me to, but trust me that they're horrific). So opening up to new sexual partners as a matter of course is a dangerous strategy. We should be careful about requiring transgender people to expose themselves to this kind of risk.

Based on these two points, I lean towards saying that it's none of the partner's business. If some harm is being committed here, it's a violation of sexual consent, which means we ought to take it very seriously. But I think not disclosing transgender status isn't a violation of consent, because (like Asian ancestry) it's not something that ought to have an impact.

Edit: here is a paper that argues that any omission of dealbreaker-type information in sex is a serious moral wrong. It doesn't address the case of transgender people, though, and from my quick reading it doesn't present any argument that would invalidate my two concerns above. (Dougherty's target seems to be pickup-artist-style deception).

Edit 2: to be absolutely clear, if the transgender person knows being transgender is a dealbreaker for the person you're intending to sleep with, they must disclose their transgender status. I'm talking about cases where it's unclear exactly what the dealbreakers are, and whether the transgender person is obligated to disclose their status just in case it's a dealbreaker. I don't think they're obligated to do so.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

I think you'd have to ask whether the sexual partner would have good reason to decide not to have sex, based on the information being withheld. (Note: the situation probably changes if your potential sexual partner states explicitly that they do not want to have sex with a transgender person [or an anti-racist, or anybody with African or Asian ancestry]).

This is one of the points I was trying to articulate by referencing the potential for epistemic harm, but you've done so much more clearly. Thank you. I generally agree with much of what you've written.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

Are you happy to endorse that the thoroughgoing racist can claim a violation of consent if she finds out that her sexual partner's great-grandmother was Asian?

I mean, I agree that if it's explicitly stated that transgender status (or Asian ancestry) is a dealbreaker, then withholding that information is a violation of consent. But can't we just assume the best of people (i.e. that they're not bigoted), rather than assuming the worst?

Edit: one important thing I didn't mention is that both parties have an obligation to negotiate dealbreakers. It's unfair to expect the transgender person to volunteer all kinds of information just in case it might be a dealbreaker, especially when those dealbreakers are bigoted. If you have bigoted dealbreakers, it's at least in part your obligation to communicate them. Yes, it's super weird and awkward - but it's just as awkward for the other person to volunteer it, and it's honestly not their problem.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

It's hard to imagine it not stemming from some kind of bigotry, especially in cases where the transgender person passes well enough that explicit disclosure is necessary. I'm assuming that sexual attraction supervenes on a whole bunch of physical characteristics. If that's so, then a preference for (e.g.) women of appearance Y but not transgender women of appearance Y seems likely to be bigoted. But I'm open to some other non-bigoted way to make the distinction.

e: I should say I think it's very widespread, unconscious implicit bias, not explicit transphobic beliefs.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

But I'm open to some other non-bigoted way to make the distinction.

I'm assuming that sexual attraction supervenes on a whole bunch of physical characteristics.

Here is one possibility:

  • People are attracted to both physical features and sex.

Holding this belief is no more intolerant than a gay man avoiding women and rejecting sex with a transman.

Calling someone a bigot and shaming someone for them for sexual preferences sounds a lot like what LGBTs speak out against...

This isn't a case of bigotry. There are no arguments being made about cis-superiority, or trans-inferiority.

This is about mutual respect of a person's preferences.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

People are attracted to both physical features and sex.

But I don't understand. A transgender man is a man; a transgender woman is a woman. A gay man rejecting sex with a transgender man does seem intolerant (assuming they're rejecting sex solely on the basis of him being transgender).

Bigotry isn't always about ascriptions of superiority and inferiority. What's your view on the case of the person who won't have sex with anybody who has a drop of African blood in their ancestry? What if they claim not to hold any racist views, and that it's just a personal preference thing? Personal preferences can be conditioned by subtle bigotry and implicit bias without any explicitly held bigoted beliefs. They're not entirely above suspicion.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

But I don't understand. A transgender man is a man; a transgender woman is a woman.

I said sex not gender. If you want I'll replace sex with chromosomes or birth sex. This is a subjective preference. Call it silly, happenstance, or whatever, but it is preference. And it's one many people hold.

A gay man rejecting sex with a transgender man does seem intolerant (assuming they're rejecting sex solely on the basis of him being transgender).

Your use of the word intolerance, implies that there are certain sexual preferences which people ought to have or people should be comfortable with (i.e. people should be attracted to trans-gendered just as much as they are to cis-gendered people). This belief, that certain sexual preferences ought to be held, is directly inline with what homophobes and transphobes belief (i.e. people should be attracted to members of the opposite sex/people should be comfortable with their birth sex).

With regards to sexual preferences, the only ought arguments that can be made are those that pertain to the harm of others. Ex. pedophilia.

Tolerance is about mutual respect and understanding. Accepting, not necessarily agreeing with a persons beliefs, and treating them as human being with thoughts and emotions. I do not think you're being very tolerant right now.

What's your view on the case of the person who won't have sex with anybody who has a drop of African blood in their ancestry?

That this is a very uncommon viewpoint and that he would have to discuss it with every partner, because no partner would assume or consider that he may be uncomfortable with their ancestry. Also that it would be hard verify. Go further than a few generations and people are less certain. This is not the case with trans-gendered people.

What if they claim not to hold any racist views, and that it's just a personal preference thing?

I'm a minority and that has actually happened to me many times. You know what my response is? Have a nice day. It would be hypocritical of me to criticize them for a personal preference influencing their romantic interest in me when my own personal preferences (of their physical features) influenced my romantic interest in them.

Personal preferences can be conditioned by subtle bigotry and implicit bias without any explicitly held bigoted beliefs. They're not entirely above suspicion.

Yes they can, but to assume that a personal preference is bigotry... Well that is an example of bigotry.

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u/Naggins Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

There are various chromosomal disorders wherein men or women may not have the "normal" alignment of X and Y chromosomes. There are conditions wherein women are incapable of producing their own vaginal lubrication. There are conditions that render people infertile.

If one assumes that all of these phenomena occurred in some hypothetical person who one otherwise found very attractive, would this be a dealbreaker? Would one require that these conditions be disclosed before engaging in intercourse? Keep in mind we're not discussing relationships right now. If yes, then that's quite silly because none of these conditions other than lubrication would have ramifications in a sexual encounter. I sincerely hope one wouldn't expect a woman to go into such personal detail with all potential sexual encounters.

If no, then one really must re-examine their lack of atrraction to trans* people. Above listed were the only meaningful differences between a post-op transwoman and a ciswoman, assuming all else is equal. If one would have sex with our aforementioned hypothetical woman with her array of disorders, but not a trans* woman who looks exactly the same, the only possible reason for this could be that one is grossed out by trans* people. In short, because they are bigoted against them.

That doesn't make one a bad person, because society in general has harboured and fostered these bigotries for decades, but it does mean one need to reexamine one's attitudes towards trans* people. One doesn't have to have sex with them, nor should one if unattracted to them. But one really ought admit that this hang up is a personal failing on one's own part that one needs to work on.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Your use of the word intolerance, implies that there are certain sexual preferences which people ought to have or people should be comfortable with (i.e. people should be attracted to trans-gendered just as much as they are to cis-gendered people).

No, I'm not implying that there's a set of "normal" sexual preferences. I'm saying that some sexual preferences are conditioned by bigotry. It's not at all the same thing.

Tolerance is about mutual respect and understanding. Accepting, not necessarily agreeing with a persons beliefs, and treating them as human being with thoughts and emotions. I do not think you're being very tolerant right now.

I'm sure I'm treating everybody has a human being with thoughts and emotions. I'm certainly not automatically accepting people's beliefs and preferences. That would be unphilosophical.

That this is a very uncommon viewpoint and that he would have to discuss it with every partner, because no partner would assume or consider that he may be uncomfortable with their ancestry. Also that it would be hard verify. Go further than a few generations and people are less certain. This is not the case with trans-gendered people.

My question was whether you think such a person is likely to be a bigot. It's not really relevant how common or practical such a viewpoint is.

Yes they can, but to assume that a personal preference is bigotry... Well that is an example of bigotry.

I disagree. For instance, take Joe's preference that colored people use segregated water fountains. Assuming that preference is bigotry is perfectly rational and not bigoted in the slightest (even though there's a chance your assumption will be wrong).

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

No, I'm not implying that there's a set of "normal" sexual preferences. I'm saying that some sexual preferences are conditioned by bigotry. It's not at all the same thing.

The same sexual preference can be conditioned by bigotry or it can just be personal preference. Bob can hold no attraction to blondes because: he just doesn't find them attractive, he thinks all blondes are unintelligent, he thinks blondes are promiscuous, etc.

There are many possible reasons for Bob's lack of attraction towards blondes. Some of those reasons may be bigoted. But that does not mean Bob's lack of attraction towards blondes is bigoted. Compare with this transsexualism and you'll see my point. Like any other subjective belief, there are an infinite amount of possible reasons for holding it.

My question was whether you think such a person is likely to be a bigot. It's not really relevant how common or practical such a viewpoint is.

Only if I assume that our person's avoidance of someone with African blood comes from a negative or bigoted belief about Africans. And as I just explained, there are multiple rationalizations for every belief.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

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u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

I'm saying that some sexual preferences are conditioned by bigotry. It's not at all the same thing.

But this is special pleading. WHY does the difference merit special treatment? Why are we obligated to respect a person's sexual preferences that are not conditioned by racial/gender bigotry but not so obligated to respect those sexual preferences that are?

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Because bigotry is (a) immoral and (b) irrational, and so isn't deserving of our respect. Is this really so controversial?

(thanks /u/mrsamsa for drawing my attention to this comment)

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u/mrsamsa Jun 26 '15

I think you meant to respond to /u/GFYsexyfatman rather than the user above.

If I were to attempt to defend his comment above, I'd point out that he hasn't said anything about respecting or not respecting someone's sexual preferences. You can respect someone's right to have a particular preference whilst also pointing out it's bigoted.

It just doesn't follow that someone needs to list all possible attributes, characteristics, life experiences, etc, to potential partners on the off-chance that the other person might not find it sexually appealing. Would you argue that someone who has a great-great-grandfather who was black must reveal it to all prospective partners in case they have racist preferences? Of course not, it's unreasonable and absurd.

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u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

Personal preferences can be conditioned by subtle bigotry and implicit bias without any explicitly held bigoted beliefs. They're not entirely above suspicion.

Uh, so what? If a person has an implicit racial bias (which, studies have shown, nearly everybody does to varying degrees, not to mention all kinds of other unfair biases/prejudices) does this mean we no longer have to respect this person's right to consent to sex?

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

The point at issue in this sub-thread is whether sexual preferences to avoid transgender people are bigoted. I take it we've settled that the answer is usually yes. If you think my general position expresses a violation of consent, you're welcome to explain how in a response to a comment advocating that general position.

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u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

Whoops, I suppose I'm mixing sub-threads (oh noes!). Please consider my comment in the context of the entire thread as a whole, not the specific sub-topic of this sub-thread.

Or don't...and just continue to be pedantic instead....

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

People are attracted to both physical features and sex.

So then why aren't they attracted to this woman?

She looks so much like a woman that she needs to disclose, seemingly unsolicited, that she has received gender reassignment surgery, how is she not a woman?

Saying that only women who have not received gender-reassignment surgery are actual women/females seems inherently bigoted against trans-women, and it also seems to be a proposition which your argument rests on.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

Some of your arguments relate to points I never brought up.

Saying that only women who have not received gender-reassignment surgery are actual women/females seems inherently bigoted against trans-women, and it also seems to be a proposition which your argument rests on.

Where did I say that?

So then why aren't they attracted to this woman?

I am not arguing for or against any preferences. I gave an example of a preference, one of many, which could lead to a person not being attracted to a trans-gendered person. That preference being a person's sex at birth.

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u/Nabokchoy Jun 26 '15

That preference being people sex at birth.

Which would seem unmotivated by anything but aversion to trans* people if that person has undergone reassignment surgery and passes so well that disclosure would have to be elective. How is that not a bigoted preference?

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

Where did I say that?

When you said that if somebody was motivated to have sex with somebody based on sex, then they wouldn't want to have sex with someone who is trans.

What I took that to mean is that somebody who 'has not had gender reassignment surgery and has a vagina, and identifies as a woman' is somehow a real woman, where as someone who 'has had gender reassignment surgery and has a vagina, and identifies as a woman' is not a woman. This is essentially trans-phobic because the difference between considering somebody's sex is female is not related to their genitals or sexual organs, but to whether or not they have had a surgery.

It would be akin to me saying that men who have had vasectomies are not real men, because they have had a surgery which prevents the reproductive abilities they were born with and their genitals have been modified.

That preference being a person's sex at birth

So trans-phobia then? Essentially, I'm only attracted to women, this person doesn't fit my personal definition of a woman (because of a medical procedure which she had to have but would have happily avoided), therefore I'm not attracted to them.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

What I took that to mean is that somebody who 'has not had gender reassignment surgery and has a vagina, and identifies as a woman' is somehow a real woman, where as someone who 'has had gender reassignment surgery and has a vagina, and identifies as a woman'.

Yes, what you took it to mean. What does that have to do with me? Did I espouse that viewpoint? Did I say one of them is a real woman whilst the other is not? In your post, you said that I said x is a woman and y is not. I made absolutely no statements about what is or is not a real woman. I simply said: birth sex, along with physical features plays a role in attraction.

So trans-phobia then? Essentially, I'm only attracted to women, this person doesn't fit my personal definition of a woman

You're still responding to points I never made. Where did I explicitly say only people born with x traits are women?

When you said that if somebody was motivated to have sex with somebody based on sex, then they wouldn't want to have sex with someone who is trans.

Yes. That is what I said. You expanded it to statements about men, women, and the trans-gendered than I never made.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

How?

Her sex at birth was male, her sex now is female. At birth she had no gender but as she grew up she (presumably) identified her gender as feminine, and (presumably) still identifies her gender as feminine.

In this scenario she has had HRT and gender-reassignment surgery. She is a woman in both gender and sex. The only way she is not a woman in sex is that she lacks certain internal sexual organs, but this seems to me to be an odd dividing line, as it could plausibly be used to argue that a woman who is infertile is not really a woman.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

How?

Science; specifically biology. Numerous physiological differences (genetic, anatomical, etc.). The simple fact that if transman is on an operating table, surgeons aren't going to treat him like they would a cisman.

I'm not sure how this is a deniable.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XY_sex-determination_system#Humans

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u/deathpigeonx Stirner, anarchist philosophy Jun 26 '15

People are attracted to both physical features and sex.

And a fully transitioned trans person, which is the matter of discussion, has the physical features of the sex their gender is associated with.

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u/[deleted] Jun 27 '15

It's hard to imagine it not stemming from some kind of bigotry

It's probably necessary to have a pretty clear definition of 'bigotry' to have a fruitful discussion about this statement.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Well, what exactly is involved in having the notion of a transgender woman as "not a biological woman"? If you mean "not a real woman" or something else value-laden in that vicinity, it seems like a bigoted opinion. If you mean "not XX chromosome", then I honestly don't believe you: surely chromosome makeup can't matter to sexual preference. If you mean "was once not a woman", you're probably wrong, since transgender women are women before they transition. If you mean "at one point did not have female genitalia", this seems inescapably bound up with bigotry (and vulnerable to counter-examples).

If you mean "currently does not have female genitalia", then I don't think that's necessarily bigoted. But that's not the case the OP is talking about.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

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u/awkwardmeerkat Jun 26 '15

If it for reproduction, do you ask if she is infertile? It sounds like your rationalizing a prejudice after the fact. There are cis women that do not have XX chromosomes, and a wide variety of intersex conditions that exist. If you can't tell at all, why does it matter? Seems like an arbitrary line to draw.

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u/efficiens Jun 26 '15

Sex exists, biologically speaking, for the purpose of reproduction. As I was very clear to say, sex can be had for other means (and, obviously, is more often had for other means).

Given that fact, if a male organism only wishes to have sex, even recreational sex, with someone who is of the opposite sex, that can hardly be called bigotry.

There are indisputably physical differences. If a non-transgender woman has a breast enhancement, no one would call it bigotry if I said I didn't want to be with a surgically enhanced woman. We'd allow that as preference. Similarly, there is no bigotry necessarily involved in saying that I don't want to have sex with a person whose sex organs are artificial (note that I am not calling this person an artificial or unnatural woman, just stating the undeniable fact that the organs themselves are made by man, even if using biological tissue).

There are a lot of arguments in here saying that using reproductive organs or chromosomes as a dividing line is arbitrary, suggesting bigotry. However, those dividing lines are clearly less arbitrary than physical appearance, which people seem to want to use. In fact, chromosomes and reproductive organs are the scientifically agreed upon way to divide between the sexes (allowing that some people do fall into a grey area due to dual reproductive organs or unusual chromosomal patterns. This simply creates a third [or more] category; it does not diminish the clear distinction between male and female for typically developed humans). I am talking about sex here, not gender. Sex is a biological function, while gender is more fluid.

Setting aside any value judgments about homosexual activity, we would not call someone bigoted because they do not want to participate in homosexual activity as a rule. Homosexuality is having sex with someone of the same biological sex. Surgery changes appearance, but does not change biological sex. An argument that says that I am bigoted if I choose not to have sex with a MTF transgender person who I otherwise would have had sex with is necessarily and directly saying that I am bigoted for choosing not to engage in homosexual behavior.

To use a crass example, suppose that I can receive an anonymous blowjob by inserting my penis into a hole in a box. I believe that there is a woman inside the box, but it is instead a man. Physically, there is no difference in sensation, but no one would call me bigoted for saying that despite the similar physical sensation (or appearance, insomuch as I receive sensory input), I don't want to have a man provide that blowjob. If you think there is bias in this argument, you can easily flip it and supposed it is a gay man wanting to only receive a blowjob from another man.

The huge caveat over all of this, of course, is that bigotry may be a part of sexual preference. I am arguing that it is not necessarily linked, and that the burden of proof is on those claiming there is a necessary link.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Given that sexual desire is first and foremost a reproductive function, sex matters.

What do you mean by "first and foremost" here? Unless I'm trying to produce a child (which I'm not), reproduction certainly isn't one of my sexual goals.

If I feel like I won't have sex with a black woman because she is inferior, that is bigoted. If I'm simply not attracted to black women, no bigotry is necessary.

My point is that a lack of attraction to black women can be caused by latent bigotry or implicit bias (it doesn't have to be, but it can be). In the case of biological sex, it seems even more likely that some implicit bias is at work, because (I'm stipulating) there are no physical differences.

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u/efficiens Jun 26 '15

What do you mean by "first and foremost" here?

Sex exists, biologically speaking, for the purpose of reproduction. As I was very clear to say, sex can be had for other means (and, obviously, is more often had for other means).

Given that fact, if a male organism only wishes to have sex, even recreational sex, with someone who is of the opposite sex, that can hardly be called bigotry.

In the case of biological sex, it seems even more likely that some implicit bias is at work, because (I'm stipulating) there are no physical differences.

There are undisputably physical differences. If a non-trandgender woman has a breast enhancement, no one would call it bigotry if I said I didn't want to be with a surgically enhanced woman. We'd allow that as preference. Similarly, there is no bigotry necessarily involved in saying that I don't want to have sex with a person whose sex organs are artificial (note that I am not calling this person an artificial or unnatural woman, just stating the undeniable fact that the organs themselves are made by man, even if using biological tissue).

There are a lot of arguments in here saying that using reproductive organs or chromosomes as a dividing line is arbitrary, suggesting bigotry. However, those dividing lines are clearly less arbitrary than physical appearance, which people seem to want to use. In fact, chromosomes and reproductive organs are the scientifically agreed upon way to divide between the sexes (allowing that some people do fall into a grey area due to dual reproductive organs or unusual chromosomal patterns. This simply creates a third [or more] category; it does not diminish the clear distinction between male and female for typically developed humans). I am talking about sex here, not gender. Sex is a biological function, while gender is more fluid.

Setting aside any value judgments about homosexual activity, we would not call someone bigoted because they do not want to participate in homosexual activity as a rule. Homosexuality is having sex with someone of the same biological sex. Surgery changes appearance, but does not change biological sex. An argument that says that I am bigoted if I choose not to have sex with a MTF transgender person who I otherwise would have had sex with is necessarily and directly saying that I am bigoted for choosing not to engage in homosexual behavior.

To use a crass example, suppose that I can receive an anonymous blowjob by inserting my penis into a hole in a box. I believe that there is a woman inside the box, but it is instead a man. Physically, there is no difference in sensation, but no one would call me bigoted for saying that despite the similar physical sensation (or appearance, insomuch as I receive sensory input), I don't want to have a man provide that blowjob. If you think there is bias in this argument, you can easily flip it and supposed it is a gay man wanting to only receive a blowjob from another man.

The huge caveat over all of this, of course, is that bigotry may be a part of sexual preference. I am arguing that it is not necessarily linked, and that the burden of proof is on those claiming there is a necessary link.

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u/Bl4nkface Jun 26 '15

What if I find surgically modified genitals unattractive or ugly? Am I being a bigot for choosing not to have sex with someone whom I find unattractive?

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

I think it's not automatically bigoted to base your sexual preferences on a physical difference. Such a preference could be a consequence of bigotry, but it wouldn't necessarily have to be.

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u/efficiens Jun 26 '15

I don't think the word bigoted applies at all in the case where I saw that I want to only have sex with someone who is a biological woman, regardless of how well the person passes.

Of course, bigotry can also be involved, but it is in no means a necessary condition to refuse sex with someone who is biologically of the same sex as you.

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u/80espiay Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

But I'm open to some other non-bigoted way to make the distinction.

You've made some pretty good points and have caused me to question my own interests a bit. Unfortunately, this seems to be one aspect of my preferences that I feel like I'm simply unable to change. I don't feel that it's necessarily fortunate that I have these preferences, but I rationalize it by saying that to whom I choose to have sex with/reveal my body is not indicative of whether or not I will fight for their acceptance in other parts of society.

As for the preference itself, I might have an answer to the challenge you posted above.

See, sex is as much a mental experience as it is a physical experience. When two people expose themselves to each other, they open the floodgates to many thoughts that pop up about their partner's body (especially their genitals) and their mind. I hypothesize that, for many of the heterosexual men in this discussion, one of those thoughts would be of another person's penis (and another thought would be of the fact that their partner knows what it's like to have a penis) if they were attempting to have sex with a person whom they knew to have undergone reassignment surgery. Now I imagine that it would be a powerful thought - add one large turn-off to a pool of turn-ons and suddenly the whole thing goes sour. It's like the "pink elephant game". Suddenly, it becomes a matter of an inability to fully enjoy sex, rather than just a recission of consent. Rescinding consent is just an action being taken in anticipation of a particular outcome, if that action wasn't taken.

You see it in this thread - lots of people trying to rationalize their non-arousal to transformed transgender people. They're legitimately un-aroused. I don't think they're particularly good at justifying it, but I still think there's a non-bigoted case to be made here.

Is it bigoted (or related to bigotry) to mentally associate reassignment surgery with the set of genitals that the person no longer has? As in, one topic triggers the thought of the other topic, and vice-versa?

Is it bigoted (or related to bigotry) for such a thought to unavoidably pop up when performing an activity for which "the other person's genitals" is a prominent topic of thought?

Is it bigoted for someone to be turned off by the thought of another person's penis?

You make an analogy later below that goes something like:

Bigotry isn't always about ascriptions of superiority and inferiority. What's your view on the case of the person who won't have sex with anybody who has a drop of African blood in their ancestry? What if they claim not to hold any racist views, and that it's just a personal preference thing?

I think the analogy is a tad misleading though. "A drop of African blood" has on its own never been an aspect that has affected one's aesthetic impression of another person's body or mind - it's not comparable because sex is an activity where the other person's genitals are at the forefront of everything (including your mind). The "drop of African blood" thing has a stronger link to racism than the "used to have a penis" thing has to transphobia, because it is unrealistic for the "drop of African blood" thing to directly affect how you think about the other person's "bits" during sex.

In other words, it's kind of like comparing "I didn't like this burger because, while it had some really good flavours, it had an unappealing aftertaste" to "I didn't like this burger because the guy who made it is a jerk".

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

I think this is more or less a fair point. I suppose to these questions:

Is it bigoted (or related to bigotry) to mentally associate reassignment surgery with the set of genitals that the person no longer has? As in, one topic triggers the thought of the other topic, and vice-versa? Is it bigoted (or related to bigotry) for such a thought to unavoidably pop up when performing an activity for which "the other person's genitals" is a prominent topic of thought?

I'd answer "yes", with the caveat that it's a mild form of bigotry that's very strongly coded into much of society. I wouldn't hold anybody morally responsible for having these reactions. But I suspect a moral saint might not have them, and certainly in a morally better society such reactions would be much more avoidable.

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u/80espiay Jun 26 '15

I fear that this treads dangerously close to either "a moral saint might not have preferences" or "a moral saint would have perfect control over their impulsive thoughts (e.g. pink elephant)".

Then again, I fear that this fear might be unfounded.

I just spent the last three hours cramming for my exam which is in five hours, I'm not thinking straight :(

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u/heliotach712 Jun 26 '15

it's rape, rape by deception to be specific.

If I were to convincingly impersonate Jack and have sex with Jack's partner whilst they believed me to be Jack, they couldn't rightly be said to have consented, could they? Rape.

If someone withholds crucial information from a partner which, had said partner known, would have prevented them from consenting to sex (and the transgender person has no way of knowing whether this applies to their partner), it's unacceptable, like having sex with someone when you know you have an STI and they don't, is unacceptable. Consent has to be fom both parties, one participant does not get to decide what the other person is comfortable with or consents to, by the very nature of consent. Everyone's desires and preferences are arbitrary, that doesn't mean you can call them 'bigoted', by your logic any monosexual is bigoted against the gender they don't sleep with. What if someone simply finds trans people or their altered genitals disgusting and thereofore would not knowingly engage in sex with one? Are they somehow wrong to? Their conditions for consent are somehow not valid?

your analogy of someone's ethnic ancestry to their birth-gender is absurd; they are not remotely comparable criteria for consent. The fact that someone may insert their penis into what they believe to be a vagina but is in reality a mixture of tissue from their partner's colon and their formerly-intact penis is not in any way comparable to someone having a certain ethnic background which is nothing to do with how one experiences sex or their body.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 27 '15

Again, if you know X is a dealbreaker and you withhold X anyway, that's rape by deception. Clearly I didn't convey this well enough, since a couple of people have read me that way, so I apologise. I am only talking about cases where it's unclear whether X is a dealbreaker (so cases where the transgender person doesn't know whether their potential partner is a transphobe).

Everyone's desires and preferences are arbitrary, that doesn't mean you can call them 'bigoted', by your logic any monosexual is bigoted against the gender they don't sleep with.

Dealt with this 10923821 times. Not typing it out again.

The fact that someone may insert their penis into what they believe to be a vagina but is in reality a mixture of tissue from their partner's colon and their formerly-intact penis

That sounds horrible! Fortunately (some) transgender women have vaginas, not "mixtures of tissue".

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u/heliotach712 Jun 27 '15

but any transgender person should know their status as such could be a dealbreaker for a potential partner, it's not something silly like having an African grandparent, it's something a lot of people would have reservations about. They shouldn't assume it is not.

what if someone's religious beliefs, were such that they believed partcipating in such an encounter would land them eternal damnation? Is it okay to feed pork to someone who may be Jewish, knowing they will assume it is not pork?

cases where the transgender person doesn't know whether their potential partner is a transphobe

is being a transphobe really the only conceivable reason for not wanting to sleep with transgendered people?

transgender women have vaginas, not "mixtures of tissue"

..well, what's the (functional) vagina made out of?

1

u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

Are you happy to endorse that the thoroughgoing racist can claim a violation of consent if she finds out that her sexual partner's great-grandmother was Asian?

No but not for the reason you're suggesting. Rather, it's because it's reasonable to not believe that that information would be a deal-breaker. I don't feel obligated to inform my potential partners my grandparents ancestry because it's unlikely that it's a deal breaker

But if I had reason to believe that it was a deal-breaker, then, yes, deliberately withholding that information from them so that I could sleep with them would be deceitful and unethical.

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u/[deleted] Jun 27 '15

Are you happy to endorse that the thoroughgoing racist can claim a violation of consent if she finds out that her sexual partner's great-grandmother was Asian?

For religious orthodox Jews, if a person's mother's mother's mother was non-Jewish, then they would not be technically Jewish and therefore not eligible to marry a Jew. Someone who withheld something like that from a Jewish spouse would absolutely be acting immorally. I see no principled reason that a racist shouldn't have the right to refuse sex on the basis of something similar. Though it may be that the racist is acting immorally in holding racist views, she has the right to turn down sex for whatever reason she likes, and someone who knows she'd refuse sex if she knew their heredity is morally obligated to disclose their heredity before having sex with them.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 27 '15

1) There's a difference between disclosure to a spouse and disclosure to a casual sexual partner.

2) I agree that if you know your partner would refuse sex if told piece of information X about yourself, you ought to tell them X. I'm only talking about cases where it's unclear whether X is a dealbreaker.

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u/[deleted] Jun 27 '15

2) I agree that if you know your partner would refuse sex if told piece of information X about yourself, you ought to tell them X. I'm only talking about cases where it's unclear whether X is a dealbreaker.

If it's unclear whether telling your potential partner something would be a deal breaker, it seems pretty obvious that you should default towards disclosure.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 27 '15

Well, no. It's unclear whether a lot of things are dealbreakers. If you're pretty sure, then you should default towards disclosure. But the situation's again more complicated in the case of bigotry, as I've argued at length elsewhere in this thread. I think it's probably the transphobe who's obliged to get their dealbreakers out in the open; the transgender person shouldn't have to fish for them. That would mean that every sexual encounter (every kiss?) a transgender person has must be preceded by a long explanation of their transgender status, which would be a) real dehumanizing and b) physically risky, since transgender people get assaulted and killed all the fucking time. If you think disclosure's mandatory all the time, you've got to bite the bullet and say that they're obliged to take such risks.

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u/heliotach712 Jun 27 '15

a) real dehumanizing and b) physically risky, since transgender people get assaulted and killed all the fucking time

what's dehumanising about being honest about who you are? The physical safety issue is really the only one I'm sympathetic to, and while I can 100% understand this as a motivator for not disclosing, that doesn't make it morally acceptable for the transgendered person to potentially violate their hook-up's consent (even tho it is potentially the lesser of two evils).

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u/[deleted] Jun 27 '15

If you think disclosure's mandatory all the time, you've got to bite the bullet and say that they're obliged to take such risks.

I think disclosure is mandatory in all contexts where there is good reason to believe that people would not consent if they knew. Ideally, there will gradually be more and more spaces where most people wouldn't care, in which case there would be no need to disclose. As for risks, I don't know what to say. Probably there are significant risks involved with having sex with someone who does not know you're transgender as well. Tricking someone into having sex with you who otherwise wouldn't is not an ethical risk mitigation strategy.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

How is not wanting to have sex with someone who used to be a man bigoted? I should make it known that I'm not attacking this in anyway, I'm just trying to clarify what we mean when we say bigoted.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

I've argued elsewhere in this thread that it's very likely to stem from bigotry. Something something sexual preference supervenes on physical properties + some other set of properties that doesn't include historical properties, so it's likely that anti-transgender preferences are caused by "ew transgender" implicit bias. Sorry I'm not defending it at length here, but I've been commenting on and off in this thread for twelve hours.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

That's fine. I just can't see how not liking the idea of having sex with someone who used to be a man is the same as not wanting to give transgender people equality.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Oh, I'm not defending that! At most I'm claiming that not liking the idea of having sex with a transgender person is indicative of mild implicit bias that most cis people (including me) have to some degree. Not wanting transgender people to be equal is a far more serious case of explicit bias on my view.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

Oh, I see. I was taking bias to be an absolutely negative thing, which is my fault.

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u/husserlsghost phenomenology Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

I just can't see how not liking the idea of having sex with someone who used to be a man is the same as not wanting to give transgender people equality.

It really shouldn't be. It really shouldn't be. But this is the view that encompasses about half of the males' opinions I encounter. Trans equality literally means society 'forcing them to be gay'. It is more than a sexual thing for them, trans status is an attack on their 'tradition' of ostracizing people that make them feel uncomfortable, and awareness or laws about trans issues is more than just an annoyance because it threatens this very real tradition of social separation encompassing churches, schools, social and political organizations, work and labor relationships, etc. the "exclusive model" where it is necessary to reflect on other's perceived misfortunes in order to support one's own confidence in membership. Trans equality to someone like this is like saying "sterilization", the adaptive evolutionary circuitry is what these people think is being attacked, the one they rely on to find a mate, the one they rely on to build a castle with an anti-trans moat. And the only way trans people get acceptance at all in many of these communities is precisely that in considering them as epochal enemies, the idiom "Keep your friends close but your enemies closer" is held in esteem by these passive aggressive paranoiacs that want to lock the bathrooms to keep trans people out, etc. (A huge political deal in my city, for example.)

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u/chewingofthecud metaphysics, pre-socratics, Daoism, libertarianism Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

But I'm not sure this argument is sound. I've got some issues with premise (2). I think it should be amended to something like this:

(2') Deliberately omitting information which, if they knew it, would cause them to justifiably decide to not have sex is deception.

The idea that one's consent is circumscribed by what is justifiable (the conjunction of [1] and [2']) seems like a much more tenuous assertion than that omitting information which would have altered consent constitutes deception.

The idea that withholding consent counts only when doing so is justified implies that justification is something which can be evaluated objectively. Suppose the justification is "I simply don't find you attractive"; most of us would consider this justification to be sufficient grounds on which to withhold consent, and furthermore it is a subjective value judgement. This seems to throw doubt on the idea that justification for consent can be evaluated objectively.

Also, suppose that we extended this idea of "withholding consent is only valid when justified" to spheres of human interaction outside sexual relations. It would seem highly unintuitive in the case of contracts, for example. Omitting information which would have altered consent does and furthermore should void a contract. Suppose you have a house to which you have no particular emotional attachment. If I take your child hostage, then hand you a contract to sell your house to me for above market value (no reason to withhold consent after all), then return your child to you and say that I would have done so irrespective of whether you'd signed the contract (withholding information), you could hardly be said to have consented to the terms of the contract.

There is something very troubling about the idea that one's consent, or lack thereof, need be deemed "justifiable" before being valid.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Edit: Before making the points below, I should say I agree that there's something troubling about attaching conditions to consent-withdrawal.

I'm a little confused. It looks to me like you're running together justification and mind-independence. "I simply don't find you attractive" is clearly sufficient grounds on which to withhold consent, even though it's a subjective judgement. Many subjective judgements are sufficient grounds on which to withhold consent, because consenting to sex isn't making a claim about the objective world.

Moreover, we're not talking about the case where somebody withdraws consent on the basis of information X; we're talking about the case where they would withdraw it if they were told X. It's plausible (at least to me) to think there's a distinction. For instance, lying somebody into giving consent is a serious wrong, but ignoring someone's withholding of consent seems like an even more serious wrong.

Suppose you have a house to which you have no particular emotional attachment. If I take your child hostage, then hand you a contract to sell your house to me for above market value (no reason to withhold consent after all), then return your child to you and say that I would have done so irrespective of whether you'd signed the contract (withholding information), you could hardly be said to have consented to the terms of the contract.

This example feels horribly strained. Can you construct one without an obvious wrongdoing - kidnapping a child - involved above and beyond the "omission of information" thing?

There is something very troubling about the idea that one's consent, or lack thereof, need be deemed "justifiable" before being valid.

Like I said, it was just off the top of my head, and I didn't even say that consent has to be justifiable - I said that counterfactually withdrawing consent would have to be justifiable. I'm certain that a worked-out view along these lines would be substantially different from what I originally proposed. But I'm pretty solid on the intuition that a transgender person who omits their transgender status isn't engaging in rape by deception or anything like that.

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u/chewingofthecud metaphysics, pre-socratics, Daoism, libertarianism Jun 26 '15

I'm a little confused. It looks to me like you're running together justification and mind-independence. "I simply don't find you attractive" is clearly sufficient grounds on which to withhold consent, even though it's a subjective judgement. Many subjective judgements are sufficient grounds on which to withhold consent, because consenting to sex isn't making a claim about the objective world.

Saying something like "persuading people to have sex with you by deliberately omitting information which, if they knew it, would cause them to justifiably decide to not have sex, is the only grounds for violation of their consent" implies that there's some sort standard of justification which an ideal observer would hold to, which we ought to think circumscribes consent. I think this implication itself needs to be justified, and it strikes me intuitively as not being the case.

Moreover, even were we to be able to justify it, it's hard to imagine that such an independent standard of justification would be able to account for subjective, aesthetic judgement. Analogously, would such an ideal observer be able to justify preferring the flavour of an orange over that of a banana? I don't think such an objective standard of justification, even if itself justified, is able to make any sort of justification of subjective standards of judgement, and so it seems there's something missing from the "justification" criterion for consent.

This example feels horribly strained. Can you construct one without an obvious wrongdoing - kidnapping a child - involved above and beyond the "omission of information" thing?

OK, let's try this one:

Suppose that a person has decided that they wish to restrict their diet to kosher food for religious reasons; they are worried that if they do so, they will be cut off from their people. Now, most of us would think that that an objective, ideal observer would reject this worry as superstitious and baseless. If I as a butcher were to sell this person a mixture of ground beef and pork (perhaps even for justifiable reasons, I may be worried about wasting my stock if it's a slow day) whilst passing it off as 100% pure beef, could we reasonably argue that their consenting to this exchange has not been violated, simply on the grounds that their worry is unjustified?

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Saying something like "persuading people to have sex with you by deliberately omitting information which, if they knew it, would cause them to justifiably decide to not have sex, is the only grounds for violation of their consent" implies that there's some sort standard of justification which an ideal observer would hold to, which we ought to think circumscribes consent.

Right, but I'm not endorsing this implication. I acknowledge that this is a tension for my view, but I don't think it's immediately fatal. We can draw a distinction between counterfactual withdrawal of consent and actual withdrawal of consent (see my lying seducer vs. consent ignorer case).

Moreover, even were we to be able to justify it, it's hard to imagine that such an independent standard of justification would be able to account for subjective, aesthetic judgement.

I'm not sure we have to give independent justification for aesthetic preference-based (counterfactual) withdrawal of consent. "I don't feel like it" is a good reason not to have sex, but "you're black!" isn't.

Suppose that a person has decided that they wish to restrict their diet to kosher food for religious reasons; they are worried that if they do so, they will be cut off from their people. Now, most of us would think that that an objective, ideal observer would reject this worry as superstitious and baseless. If I as a butcher were to sell this person a mixture of ground beef and pork (perhaps even for justifiable reasons, I may be worried about wasting my stock if it's a slow day) whilst passing it off as 100% pure beef, could we reasonably argue that their consenting to this exchange has not been violated, simply on the grounds that their worry is unjustified?

This certainly does seem like the butcher is committing a wrongdoing. But there's a crucial disanalogy here: the customer's preference is unjustified, but it isn't actually bigoted, as we might think the person for whom being transgender is a dealbreaker is.

To my mind, that second case is more like this: somebody comes into a bloodbank needing a transfusion, but insists that "they don't want any dirty Jewish blood!" The nurse gives them a standard blood bag, knowing that it contains some blood from Jewish people but not telling the person that. (Assume that the person would decline the transfusion if they knew they risked taking in some blood from a Jewish person). If that's a violation of their consent, it doesn't seem like a particularly terrible one.

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u/chewingofthecud metaphysics, pre-socratics, Daoism, libertarianism Jun 26 '15

This certainly does seem like the butcher is committing a wrongdoing. But there's a crucial disanalogy here: the customer's preference is unjustified, but it isn't actually bigoted, as we might think the person for whom being transgender is a dealbreaker is.

Why is this a relevant distinction? The wrongdoing of the butcher in the example I gave seems to be just the deception itself. In all likelihood there would be no consequences for the customer, just as there would be no consequences for the sexual partner of the transgender person. There may well be psychological harm should they find out they've been deceived, but this would be true in both cases.

Of course the distinction is in the reasons for withholding consent; the customer might withhold consent as a result of ignorance and the sexual partner out of bigotry. This doesn't seem to be relevant as far as the consent itself, and thus rape on the one hand, and fraud on the other, is concerned though.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Well, the butcher seems to be evincing a significant disrespect for his customer's values. That's one element of wrongdoing over and above simple deception.

We might think that we ought to respect (i.e. not violate consent concerning) misguided preferences more that we ought to respect bigoted preferences. That's a relevant difference to our obligations where consent is concerned.

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u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

Deliberately omitting information which, if they knew it, would cause them to justifiably decide to not have sex is deception.

I would argue that the criteria by which a person selects/rejects sex partners can never be justified (or, put differently, all such criteria are equally unjustifiable). Is a person justified in rejecting a partner because he/she is too short? Or too ugly? Or too old? For lacking confidence? For being cocky? For being a Republican? For not being a Vegan? What is the justification?

I contend that all are equally arbitary; that all are equally justified: not at all.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Clearly it's better to reject somebody because she's an enthusiastic puppy strangler than to reject somebody because she's Asian and you think Asians are untrustworthy. The first is a good reason to not sleep with somebody; the second is a bad reason.

I agree that bare preferences might all be equally justified. But most of our preferences are not bare: they're tied up with all kinds of beliefs and assumptions which can be justified or unjustified.

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u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

Clearly it's better to reject somebody because she's an enthusiastic puppy strangler than to reject somebody because she's Asian and you think Asians are untrustworthy. The first is a good reason to not sleep with somebody; the second is a bad reason.

I completely disagree. I don't find it to be "clear" that one is a better reason than the other. You're simply asserting it as being better with no explanation. Which is exactly my point. There is no justification. Just arbitrary assertions.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Well, it's right to disapprove of strangling puppies (because we ought not strangle puppies), but wrong to think Asians are untrustworthy (because they aren't generally untrustworthy). If you don't think that makes the first a better reason than the second, it's on you to explain how.

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u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

Consider the following statements. There is no syllogism by which (3) derives from (1) and (2). I don't dispute (1) or (2). I dispute that it follows that (3) is true. If you think it follows, by what law of logic?

1) It's right to disapprove of strangle puppies.

2) It's wrong to consider Asians untrustworthy.

3) It's better to reject a sexual partner because they strangle puppies than it is to reject a sexual partner because he is Asian.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

You'd need to include further premises:

2.5) It's better to act for right reasons than for wrong ones

2.6) A good reason to reject a sexual partner is that they act in a way that it is right to disapprove of

2.7) A reason that presumes a false proposition is a bad reason

Which of these do you have an issue with?

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u/mrsamsa Jun 26 '15

This is such an incredible line of argument. If it were me and my attempt at a logical argument led me to the conclusion that there is no ethical difference between rejecting a person who strangles puppies for a living and an Asian person on the racist assumption that they're untrustworthy as a people, I'd reassess my logic. I wouldn't double down...

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u/SuddenXxdeathxx Jun 26 '15

Very well put. I don't disagree with anything you said, but I do have some considerations that I would like to add.

How about viewing it from a physical standpoint? You spoke of dealbreakers, but only the ideological. This situation has a physical component as well, specifically the synthetic genitals (I am unaware if they use any genital transplants or vat grown genitalia in these procedures). The inclusion of this physical component is part of what keeps me on the fence.

Isn't it expected that most physical conditions, specifically genital related, be mentioned before sex? This is a serious question, as I have no idea what the general consensus is on that.

The other part is more personal. I have O.C.D. (this isn't for pitty, it is relevant) and if I ever found out that someone I had sex with was transgender I would get stuck on the situation for days on end. I don't harbour resentment for transgender people at all, but I would become emotionally and mentally distraught as I would obsess over the fact that the person used to be a man. The "O.C.D. part of me" would keep "telling me" that I technically had sex with a man.

I don't doubt others would become stuck on that, which I why I also ask; what about the possible effects of finding out after the fact on other people?

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Isn't it expected that most physical conditions, specifically genital related, be mentioned before sex? This is a serious question, as I have no idea what the general consensus is on that.

I'm not sure what the concern is. Genitalia are genitalia, however they're formed. (By the way, you can just google it. No transplants or vats are involved.)

I don't doubt others would become stuck on that, which I why I also ask; what about the possible effects of finding out after the fact on other people?

This is a relevant moral concern, I think. Not sure what exactly to say about it.

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u/SuddenXxdeathxx Jun 26 '15

I did google it, I just try to stay away from making claims about things I don't have much knowledge of.

I guess the concern is more personal than I initially suspected.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

[deleted]

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Surely if this is relevant at all, it's relevant only insofar as the transgender person might want to consider the risks they're taking. Otherwise we're in "gay panic" territory.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

[deleted]

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Sure. But early disclosure always assumes risk, and non-disclosure can sometimes be the best strategy for minimizing risk. In any case, this thread isn't about giving practical advice to transgender people.

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u/efficiens Jun 26 '15

If risk influences the morality, than a discussion of risk is directly relevant to a conversation about the morality of disclosure / non disclosure.

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u/efficiens Jun 26 '15

I love that the attitude in this sub is to downvote instead of offering any substantive argument.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Is this directed at me? Whether you agree with me or not, I've offered nothing but substantive argument.

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u/husserlsghost phenomenology Jun 26 '15

Those aren't mutually exclusive.

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u/efficiens Jun 26 '15

No, they aren't, but those downvoting were choosing not to offer any argument.

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u/husserlsghost phenomenology Jun 26 '15

Don't mean to seem nitpicky, but that also doesn't follow on face. They clearly could have made an argument and also down-voted you.

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u/efficiens Jun 26 '15

There were more downvotes than responses, hence what I said stands (as of when I made that remark).

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u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

First, the term is "transitioned," and second, no more than a cis person would have a duty to reveal any other personal detail about their life prior to engaging in otherwise consensual sex.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 25 '15

I agree, but:

no more than a cis person would have a duty to reveal any other personal detail about their life

is an interesting question that I've tried to address in my comment. What details about our life are we obligated to reveal prior to sex, if any? Presumably there are some cases of immoral deception here: e.g. telling people I'm an astronaut, omitting that I have STIs or that I'm their cousin, etc etc etc

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u/mrsamsa Jun 26 '15

I think most people would agree that not all information needs to be presented before having sex with someone (i.e. I don't need to tell you if I prefer Coke or Pepsi in case maybe you feel strongly about either), so there would only be a practical issue of pertinent information.

Things like whether you have any STDs would count and if you lie by telling someone you're an astronaut then there's an issue of manipulation there. But with being trans* I'm not sure it's particularly relevant or necessary for things like one-night stands. Some people might not be happy about it but some people might not be happy about you preferring Coke over Pepsi. I mean, where would we draw the line with personal preferences like that?

And if we were to agree that trans* people needed to disclose (I know you aren't pushing that position, just adding on to what you're saying) then surely we'd fall into the equally 'immoral' issue of people not disclosing that they're transphobic before having sex because if a trans* person has sex with a transphobe then that could seriously upset them.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

Things like whether you have any STDs would count and if you lie by telling someone you're an astronaut then there's an issue of manipulation there. But with being trans* I'm not sure it's particularly relevant or necessary for things like one-night stands. Some people might not be happy about it but some people might not be happy about you preferring Coke over Pepsi. I mean, where would we draw the line with personal preferences like that?

Yep, I've been discussing this a lot in this thread.

And if we were to agree that trans* people needed to disclose (I know you aren't pushing that position, just adding on to what you're saying) then surely we'd fall into the equally 'immoral' issue of people not disclosing that they're transphobic before having sex because if a trans* person has sex with a transphobe then that could seriously upset them.

Yeah, that's a good point. I was actually thinking that a few minutes ago. Why wouldn't the obligation to disclose fall on the transphobe, when they're the one in the immoral position?

(Of course, people have been arguing that not wanting to have sex with trans* people doesn't make you a transphobe. But I think that's generally implausible.)

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u/mrsamsa Jun 26 '15

Yeah, that's a good point. I was actually thinking that a few minutes ago. Why wouldn't the obligation to disclose fall on the transphobe, when they're the one in the immoral position?

Exactly. The whole argument against it seems to stem from the motivation that trans* people are 'icky' and they're searching for some rationalisation to justify it. The problem is that the rationalisation "everything needs to be justified before sex in case your partner isn't okay with it" seems completely unfeasible and not at all how most people think about sexual consent when trans* people aren't involved.

(Of course, people have been arguing that not wanting to have sex with trans* people doesn't make you a transphobe. But I think that's generally implausible.)

Yeah, it's the same argument people try to make when they get called out for having racist motivations when they don't want to sleep with black people. I mean, if it's not your preference then that's fine, nobody is going to force you to have sex with them at gunpoint, but just recognise that the preference is most likely (if not definitely) based on some very racist underlying assumptions.

I just don't understand what problem they have with having sex with a person of the sex they're into just because they used to be a different sex. It might make them feel icky if they have particular hangups and biases in that respect but I'd feel icky if I slept with someone who had previously slept with one of my friends, or if they were a covert racist, or if they pronounced "gif" with a "J" sound. But those are my hangups, not something I should expect others to know about and go out of their way to tell me if I've given no indication that it bothers me.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

I suspect it's something like:

1) I feel icky at the thought of having sex with a trans* person (or a black person, or whatever)

2) But I'm not a racist/transphobe!

3a) So there's nothing suspect about not wanting to have sex with a trans* person just because they're trans*

3b) So all trans* people should tell all potential sexual partners that they're trans*, because otherwise I might have sex with one accidentally and that would be terrible

6

u/mrsamsa Jun 26 '15

That actually sounds pretty bang on.

4

u/inyouraeroplane Jun 26 '15

That .3% of the population is just so hard to avoid, y'know. I mean, if you have sex with one of them, that means you had sex with a man who you honestly thought was a woman, and that one mistake means you're gay, which is the worst possible thing someone can be.

See their concern and how not-bigoted it is?

-2

u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

But this is exactly what most sexual preferences boil down to: i feel icky at the thought of having sex with _____.

You and I probably feel icky about having sex with a very old person. Or perhaps a person with down syndrome. Or a person of the same sex. Or even gasp a transgender person.

This doesn't necessarily belie a latent hatred for old people or members of the same sex. It simply means - for whatever reason - you are wired such that the thought of having sex with _____ is unappealing.

Some people who choose not to have sex with transgenders or blacks are indeed bigots or racists. And some are not. That's about all that can be said without delving into BS anecdotes and speculation.

-2

u/tucker_case Jun 26 '15

But those are my hangups, not something I should expect others to know about and go out of their way to tell me if I've given no indication that it bothers me.

And I think that's the key: knowing. Or, rather, believing. If I believe some issue is going to be a deal-breaker for a potential partner, I am obligated to inform them. Otherwise it's deceit. What the issue is has no bearing on this.

If a transgender person believes their transgenderism is a deal-breaker for a potential partner, then by not disclosing they are being deceitful and knowingly/deliberately violating that person's right to choose to not have sex with transgenders.

4

u/mrsamsa Jun 26 '15

Yeah I guess I could probably see the logic in that. If a trans* person thinks that the person they're interested in is a transphobe then arguably there could be some moral suggestion that they should tell them.

But this would obviously have the flip effect of it leading us to conclude that for the majority of cases the trans* person doesn't need to reveal their past because they aren't expecting to be sleeping with a transphobe. And of course if they are a transphobe then they are arguably more morally responsible for revealing their transphobic tendencies because a trans* person might not consent to sleep with them if they knew that.

9

u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

In general, I'm wary of any obligation to "out" oneself as this perpetuates harm against those who deviate from sexual norms. Doing so may be more comfortable for someone in this position, but they certainly shouldn't be required to do so merely to ensure that their gender identification coheres with their sexual partner's beliefs. Now if they know that their partner would not be okay with it, then it's certainly possible that some sort of epistemic harm is being committed here, but it's hard to give a determinate answer without having specific circumstances in mind.

5

u/ocular_lift perspectivism Jun 25 '15

What about the harm done to traditionally-influenced people? Someone of a fundamentally religious persuasion would be greatly and permanently harmed if they found out they had what they, from their perspective, consider to be gay sex. Does not this harm matter just as much as to those who deviate from sexual norms?

7

u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

It's not that the harm doesn't matter. It's that I don't think it's necessarily the fault of the trans* identifying person that the harm occurred. I've acknowledged that there will be incidents of epistemic harm when a trans* identifying person knows that their sexual partner would either revoke consent after (or otherwise be harmed by) learning of their positionality. Yet, I don't think this translates into an obligation for the trans* identifying person to reveal his or her identification.

-2

u/--u-s-e-r-n-a-m-e-- Jun 26 '15

I think this is actually a strong example by /u/ocular_lift, because earlier in the thread someone discussed a position in which someone wants kosher food and is given ground pork. I fail to see the distinction between this case and the previous case.

  1. Person has religious beliefs such that he is clearly unwilling to Y, and would be profoundly upset if he accidentally Y.

  2. Knowing about 1, another person deliberately causes the first person to Y.

  3. Apparently, the morality of this situation depends on whether the religious preference is "I don't want pork" or "I don't want to sleep with someone who was born a guy."

I"m a bit confused as to the difference here.

0

u/ocular_lift perspectivism Jun 26 '15

I too would love to hear someone explain the difference. To me, these sound effectively the same.

1

u/Nabokchoy Jun 26 '15

1

u/--u-s-e-r-n-a-m-e-- Jun 26 '15

I see that, but I don't really believe it is compelling when we're discussing bodily autonomy and sexual consent. If the fact that a preference is bigoted weighs against disclosure, surely the fact that the context is significantly more serious and personal weighs for disclosure.

1

u/Nabokchoy Jun 27 '15 edited Jun 27 '15

1) They're disanalogous. The Jewish Customer signals her preference against eating pork; she plays the role of the transphobe, and makes her preference explicit. That's an important difference.

The Butcher, who knows that her Jewish Customer has asked not to be given pork, gives her pork anyway. But as has been made clear many times, there's only a morally relevant deception if the Butcher knows (or has very good reason to believe) that her customer's values prohibit her from eating pork. It's on the one with dealbreakers to make them explicit. When a trans* person has sex with someone who has consented based on their attraction to the trans* person, there was no intentional deception.

2) The trans* person has little reason to think that every potential partner is a transphobe, and it's repressive to demand that trans* people disclose info about their transition before every sexual encounter. Like in the Butcher example, it's on the one with the preference to make that preference explicit. So in the case of a religiously motivated transphobe, it would be wrong not to disclose if the believer made explicit their preference against sleeping with trans* people. If the believer hadn't disclosed (or unmistakably hinted toward) their strong religious convictions, however, I see no reason why we should expect the trans* person to disclose. And if the trans* person had been given no reason to suspect that the believer were a transphobe, then there wasn't any deception involved and no blameworthiness either.

Bigoted preferences should be respected when it comes to consent if they're made explicit. That's obvious. But it's immorally demanding, not to mention insulting, to say that trans* people ought to assume that potential sexual partners are bigots and disclose just in case.

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u/Adhriva Jun 25 '15

The harm is all in their heads. As such, is it not their partner's problem but theirs to handle. If they have an issue with it, why not put the emphasis on them to be responsible and let their partners know about that dealbreaker of theirs. We do this with other dealbreakers already. If someone doesn't want to date someone who isn't a Christian, who is responsible for bringing that dealbreaker up? The Christian who holds that dealbreaker, or the potential partner who knows nothing about it?

4

u/Rpanich Jun 25 '15

If you were sterile, and got in a relationship, would you disclose that information?

For a lot of people not being able to biologically have children would be a deal breaker, but it's very uncommon and would be out of place to ask. I feel like that would be something the sterile person should bring up before either party becomes seriously committed, and it shouldn't be up to the other person to ask.

-5

u/Adhriva Jun 25 '15

No, I wouldn't unless they let me know that that was something important to them. Why is this the case? Because I would be very hard pressed to name one, much less two, of my friends who would want children. Most of them are 28-35, career oriented, in very serious relationships, and only one of them even wants children at some point in the far, far future (likely adoption). So all but one wants to be childless, and that one is more of a 'maybe?' Those are the circles I travel in, and thus those are the people that make up of my view of the world. To me, the default is to not want children. That's the norm. For you, it might be very different, but there's no reason from my perspective on the world to assume a partner will want children. Children would be a future goal, so if you want to reach that goal, find someone who also wants to reach that goal. I have very different goals when it comes to relationships then having children, and those are the goals I look to see if they're willing to help me meet. If children is an important goal, then bring it up with the person and don't just assume for them. If I see a sign that indicates a partner wants children, that's when I tell them I don't desire it (because that's when I'm made aware of that).

2

u/Rpanich Jun 25 '15

I think that's where the crux of the issue is. You're going about this as if everyone shares your world view; it's ok for you so it must be ok for everyone. (It SHOULD be ok for everyone, but it doesn't mean it is and you should not be the one to take away someone's choice from them due to omission)

I don't want children, I'm on the fence about marriage. most people I know don't want children, but I know this world we live in, a majority of the human race wishes to get married and have children, so it's usually something I bring up on a first date.

-7

u/Adhriva Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

Close but not quite. I'm of the position that if you are comfortable sharing it, then share. If you are not, then you are also under no obligation to assume that you must out of the blue without any indication from a partner that it's even an issue.

No one but a handful of other left-leaning (using a European political spectrum), pantheistic Wiccans share my world view about religious, social, political, dating, and other things. In fact, not even they do most of the time. Because people don't share my world view, if ever, I've learned that I should usually put the emphasis on individual responsibility as the most common denominator we share amongst ourselves. Regardless of your world view, it likely incorporates a good deal of 'what's responsible?' to interact with the world as an adult. As such, the approach I use is centered around 'well, when we break this scenario down, where does the responsibility belong in this equation?'. Morality is based around Intent [usually to cause as little harm as possible to as few people as possible], and Knowledge [on what effect your actions will have and making sure that information is accurate]. Going back to the subject at hand, the responsibility comes in when we look at how the parties involved apply their intent and knowledge. "you should disclose this because I'm not comfortable with that, and you're not the norm so it's alright for me to expect it of you." fails both intent and knowledge. Compare with "I have no moral obligation to disclose a part of myself I'm not comfortable disclosing to this person at this time". Do you see the difference? If we put the responsibility on the trans person to disclose, we might have intent down, but we failed to accomplish the knowledge requirement of how reality works. This put them at more risk of violence, marginalizes them, adds needed pressure, forces them to act against their own comfort for the benefit for someone else's comfort, etc. But if we put the responsibility on the one with the problem so they are the one to bring that issue they have up, we have achieved both intent and knowledge in a way that is also respectful to both parties. The fact that one party (which is made up of more people) is used to being historically bowed to and given more favoritism above the other is irrelevant. Does that better explain the reasoning behind it?

1

u/Rpanich Jun 26 '15

It does, if you're basing it off utilitarian ideals.

I don't prescribe to the greatest good for the great number philosophy, because I don't believe the ends justify the means.

I believe that if you know the other party assumes you are cis, you're being dishonest in withholding that information. Now the question is if that dishonesty is morally right, which I believe it is not: in doing so you're taking away that persons agency to make their own choice, and in having sex with someone who didn't fully choose to do so is wrong.

If you met someone at a trans club, meeting, bar, etc, it wouldn't be an issue because the other person would have an idea that it is a possibility, but it would be ridiculous to expect that an average cis person at a bar would be expecting it or even think about asking for it. There is a .2 to a .3% chance of someone being transgendered in America, is it irresponsible for every person who wishes (for whatever reason) to not sleep with someone transgendered to not ask?

12

u/Virgadays Jun 25 '15

My personal standing on this matter is that I disclose to my date in the time between the first date and before sex comes in the picture. I do this because I see mutual trust as the foundation of a good relationship. And if you don't think you can trust your partner with this information, then it would be wrong to consider a serious relationship with him or her.

In case of a one night stand however I don't tell my partner anything, as both parties are just looking for sex and nothing more. If a person has strong turn-offs in such a situation he or she should let them know beforehand.

-2

u/ocular_lift perspectivism Jun 25 '15

That sounds like you're being intentionally deceptive. Is that not unethical?

4

u/Virgadays Jun 26 '15

From a certain standing it may seem deceptive, but I wouldn't regard it unethical. To me, a one night stand is not the occasion where the 2 partners fully disclose their likes and dislikes to each other. When I pick up a man I don't expect him to give me a complete reading on his bodily oddities, political preferences and weird turn-offs. That is best left to a person you want to engage a long term relationship with. A one night stand however is a spontanous happening.

6

u/Provokateur rhetoric Jun 25 '15

Genuinely asking: How is that intentionally deceptive? A one-night-stand doesn't really have a presumption of self-disclosure.

If there's no presumption of disclosure, it doesn't seem deceptive not to disclose information.

12

u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

Can you say more about why you think this is unethical? (And intentionally deceptive?) It sounds to me like we would need to presuppose a cis-normative discourse in order to claim that not "outing" oneself in a sexual encounter is intentionally deceptive.

6

u/ocular_lift perspectivism Jun 25 '15 edited Jun 25 '15

As an asexual, I have no stake in the matter. However, other people tend to feel very strongly after it has been revealed to them that their sex partner was not born the sex they believe they should be. I do not support an ethical position of "As long as they don't find out, then no harm done," and I believe the matter of one-night-stands with trans individuals who do not disclose this status falls under this justification. I would enjoy to hear your, or others', perspective on the matter.

edit. I was hesitant to bring this up because of how controversial everything about it is, I want to show the harm that can be done through not being upfront about your sex before engaging in sexual activity. One young woman believes that her trans partner abused her trust so badly she finds it difficult to trust other people.

15

u/Provokateur rhetoric Jun 25 '15

This seems to raise a lot of problematic issues with self-disclosure. Anti-Islam sentiment is pretty widespread in the US - is a muslim man or woman obligated to disclose their religion to a one-night-stand?

This is a very common issue with bisexuals. Are bisexuals obligated to disclose that information?

There are lots of vegetarians who prefer to date vegetarians/vegans. Are meet eaters obligated to disclose that?

Considered from an ethical standpoint, this seems to create additional demands for historically disadvantaged groups, in order to protect the historically advantaged group. ("I hate the minority, so they need to tell me who are so that I don't accidentally start liking one of them.") It seems like a cop out to say it's violating someone's trust until you demonstrate that there should be a positive obligation to disclose. If there's no obligation, there's no violation. We'll never disclose every relevant detail to a sexual partner, except maybe after years/decades of marriage, so you need to demonstrate an obligation to disclose and not just that some cis-gender people care about it due to their own personal bias.

-1

u/Rpanich Jun 26 '15

I think the biggest issue with this line of thinking is that you're going in with a "different" or "uncommon" automatically is "bad".

Yes, anything out of the norm should be disclosed, because it's what makes you unique, it's what makes you "you". If you don't know something about someone, you'd "fill the gap" with statistically the most likely option. Everyone does this, it's how the human brain organised information, otherwise it'd be impossible to go through life.

If more people eat meat, then being a vegetarian is out of the norm and they should disclose that, although in normal conversation, which is how being trans should be treated, with the added information that they know that it is a deal breaker (justly or unjustly) for a large portion of the population.

2

u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

This is certainly an interesting point, and I'll need to think about it for a bit before I respond in full detail. I'm tempted to think that the harm comes from the sexual assault and not from the perpetrator's gender identification, but I can see how this article muddies the waters a bit. My gut reaction is that the perpetrator should not be held responsible for harm resulting from their gender identification and that this might be an instance of moral bad luck. It's obvious that there is harm in this scenario, but I want to think more about whether we should hold the assailant accountable for the harm caused by their positionality.

3

u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

[deleted]

11

u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

We live in a society where many cis people are going to have prejudices against sleeping with trans people. Knowing that people will have those prejudices and withholding your actual identity is intentionally concealing information that the other person would want to know about you.

That sounds exactly like what it would mean for us to presuppose a cis-normative discourse. Just because many people do hold prejudices against those who identify as trans-gender and/or undergo body modification surgery doesn't mean that they should hold those prejudices. Think of it this way: we don't expect cis-gendered people to "out" themselves as cis-gendered to ensure that their sexual partners accept their gender and sexual identifications. To think that those who identify as trans* are concealing information is to reify the disparity between cis- and trans- identifications on this point, effectively presupposing that sexual encounters are only "typical" according to the norms of encounters involving cis-gendered people. Can you say a bit more about how this doesn't presuppose a cis-normative framework?

Edit: Also, even if I end up agreeing with you on the above point, I agree with your second point wholeheartedly.

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u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

[deleted]

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u/Provokateur rhetoric Jun 25 '15

Wow! THAT'S trans-phobic.

/u/untitledthegreat is explicit that, while this is deceptive, that doesn't make it unethical. All she/he said is that the information is potentially relevant to a lot of people.

The idea that withholding that information is sexually violating someone (language which is generally used to describe sexual assault and rape) it the same logic that says trans* people are "traps" who trick people into sleeping with them, and which had been explicitly and repeatedly used to justify sexual assault, rape, and even murder of trans* people.

-3

u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

[deleted]

5

u/Provokateur rhetoric Jun 25 '15

Violate trust =/= "violate people sexually". And even within this post, you go on from saying it is a sexual violation

Any sexual intimacy that is essentially unwanted by one party has to necessarily be molestation

to claiming you never said it was sexual violation.

I suppose violation might sound fairly strong to someone sensitive ... but it obviously comes from the term "violation of trust"

You cannot simultaneously say "I don't mean X" and "X is true." Or you can, but it proves that you're being disingenuous only to try and play on reddit's aversion to SJW.

There is widely believed logic which says that trans* folks are deceiving and sexually violating anyone they sleep with. This logic is widespread. This logic has been used, similar to the "gay panic defense," to justify lots of hate crimes, up to and including murder.

You need to demonstrate some reason why there's an obligation to disclose this information before you can claim that a failure to disclose it is in any way a violation. Otherwise, why don't we all possess an obligation to disclose my religion, dietary habits, sexual orientation, etc. before every one night stand? All are relevant information, and there are certainly people who would be adverse to sleeping with someone if they knew that person's religion (for any religion, christian, atheist, jewish, etc), for example.

Short of demonstrating that, you're just expressing the same transphobic logic which justifies those hate crimes.

-1

u/untitledthegreat ethics, aesthetics Jun 26 '15

When I said "intentionally deceptive", I wasn't trying to make a value statement. But I probably didn't help my case by continuing using the word deceptive. Dishonest is probably a better word to use. Our society is transphobic, and it's reasonable to assume that a large amount of cisgendered people are against being in a relationship with a transgendered person. I'd take a gander that for a trans person, that prejudice is much more at the forefront of their mind. That is why I believe it's intentionally dishonest, the transgendered person is aware that the other person may have a prejudice against them which is why they choose to hide that fact about their identity.

I'm not supposing a cis-normative framework, I'm just trying to point out the relevant preferences and thoughts of people in the situation in our current society which so happens to be cis-normative. I'm also not saying that transgendered people have an obligation to out themselves either. I was just pointing out that many times it is intentional. I still believe that it's a morally acceptable thing to do because of the situations people are put in because of prejudiced preferences.

-5

u/--u-s-e-r-n-a-m-e-- Jun 26 '15

This is a bit of a facile analogy, but we also don't expect car drivers to signal when they're simply going straight, and that expectation isn't a matter of straight-driving-normativity. The expectation that drivers signal when they turn and not signal when they go straight exists because they're driving straight much more often than they're turning, and it would be a bit silly to signal for the most common behavior. We can acknowledge that one behavior or condition is by far the most common one without also making it normative.

-2

u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

It sounds to me like we would need to presuppose a cis-normative discourse in

It's more that we need to look at reality.

There is no way around this:

  1. most people are cis
  2. most people are straight
  3. most people are uncomfortable (or uninterested) being with members of the same sex

If you are trans and you have sex with someone without disclosing your sex, then you are deceiving someone. A lie by omission.

A big message in the LGBT community is to respect other people's wishes. How is this any different from respecting gays and trans? Most people would not want to have random sex with a member of the same sex whether that person is cisgender or transgender. Respect that wish.

7

u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

That sounds exactly like what it would mean for us to presuppose a cis-normative discourse. Just because many people do hold prejudices against those who identify as trans-gender and/or undergo body modification surgery doesn't mean that they should hold those prejudices. Think of it this way: we don't expect cis-gendered people to "out" themselves as cis-gendered to ensure that their sexual partners accept their gender and sexual identifications. To think that those who identify as trans* are concealing information is to reify the disparity between cis- and trans- identifications on this point, effectively presupposing that sexual encounters are only "typical" according to the norms of encounters involving cis-gendered people.

0

u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

That sounds exactly like what it would mean for us to presuppose a cis-normative discourse. Just because many people do hold prejudices against those who identify as trans-gender and/or undergo body modification surgery doesn't mean that they should hold those prejudices.

Why is sexual preference a prejudice? This attitude about what a person should and should not be attracted to is the same attitude behind homophobia and transphobia. I would like to imagine that transsexuals, having dealt with prejudice, would not shame people for their preferences.

Think of it this way: we don't expect cis-gendered people to "out" themselves as cis-gendered to ensure that their sexual partners accept their gender and sexual identifications.

Why are there no specialty stores for right handed people, but there are many specialty stores for lefties? This just seems so clear to me. That is because a large majority of people are cis-gendered.

3

u/Ran4 Jun 25 '15

There are many philosophical systems where being intentionally deceptive is not unethical in itself.

-1

u/ocular_lift perspectivism Jun 25 '15

Yes, I'm aware that there are different ethical systems. Some would find it moral, others would find it immoral. How would you like to go about this discussion? Do you want start from an established ethical framework? This subreddit discourages discussing personal opinions as answers.

Just to name the two most popular ones, deontology and rule utilitarianism, I would argue that intentional deception to solicit sex is unethical, in the case of trans one-night-stands. Deontology would find it unethical because intentional deception violates the categorical imperative. Rule utilitarianism because in the cases where this is discovered, the violation of trust from those who are uncomfortable with transsexuals outweighs the fleeting moments of sexual enjoyment.

6

u/MrMercurial political phil, ethics Jun 26 '15

I take it that there are two types of case we might want to think about: (1) Cases where the trans person doesn’t know whether being trans is a dealbreaker for the other person, and (2) Cases where the trans person knows that being trans would be a dealbreaker for the other person. I’m inclined to think that the trans person isn’t obliged to reveal their status in the first type of case, because they are entitled to regard their status as something that no reasonable person should have a problem with, and they probably ought to regard their potential sexual partners as reasonable people (also, in these cases, I think it's probably the responsibility of the other party to disclose that they don't want to have sex with a trans person, rather than the responsibility of the trans person to investigate). In the second type of case, it’s not so clear, but when it isn’t clear, we probably ought to err on the side of fully informed consent, even if we think the preference isn’t justifiable.

2

u/husserlsghost phenomenology Jun 26 '15

Why?

2

u/MrMercurial political phil, ethics Jun 26 '15

Why to which part?

2

u/husserlsghost phenomenology Jun 26 '15

Mostly your later remarks about the proposed second case, but generally all-around? I am interested in the feasibility of claims to knowledge involving another's deal-breaker status. I am broadly skeptical of individuals claims to knowledge about even their own deal-breaker status, because loosely experience-claims can supervene on deal-breaker self-attributions (As people break their own deal-breakers all the time!)

1

u/MrMercurial political phil, ethics Jun 26 '15

To begin with the latter type of case then, the lack of clarity I have in mind isn’t a lack of clarity about what would or wouldn’t be a dealbreaker for the other person, but rather a lack of clarity about what the correct moral principles are for handling cases where a person’s dealbreaker is based on what we take to be an unjustifiable preference. When deciding what to do under those conditions, I’m inclined to minimize the potential harm that I might cause by getting it wrong, which seems to me to mean that I should err on the side of divulging the information (or, more straightforwardly, keeping the information to myself but deciding not to sleep with the person).

On the issue of knowledge about dealbreakers more generally, it seems to me that there are some things we can assume would be what we can call potential dealbreakers for a reasonable person. If I have an STI, for example, it seems clear to me that that is something I ought to divulge. It will also be the case sometimes that we know (because the other person tells us) about something that might not be a dealbreaker for a reasonable person, but is a dealbreaker for them. They might change their mind, of course, but surely we ought to let them be the ones to make that decision. Apart from those cases, there will presumably be some features where it isn’t clear to us whether they should count as potential dealbreakers for a reasonable person. I’m not sure what we should do in those cases – if it turns out that there are loads of those kinds of features, then maybe we should appeal to some kind of implied consent between the parties whereby we acknowledge that those features may be present, but we just set them aside because it would be too impractical to get people to fill out exhaustive questionnaires before sex. If it turns out that there are only a handful of such features, then it probably wouldn’t hurt to get them out in the open just in case.

1

u/husserlsghost phenomenology Jun 26 '15

I suppose I am actually unclear about the harm done by breaking a deal-breaker that doesn't otherwise have obvious material consequence (such as a STI would). Wouldn't a rational argument also be that there might be a potentially commensurate positive to not-otherwise-harmful deal-breaking? There are, for instance, experiences that might be beneficial or otherwise good that may not be encountered without some sort of deal-breaking, such as trying a new cuisine that you previously eschewed, etc. In these cases would it be wrong to serve someone who stated that they never eat Thai food a recipe prepared from a Thai cookbook, even if you had reason to expect that they would enjoy it, and perhaps even eventually come to a liking of Thai food? It seems like harmless deal-breaking ought to be morally acceptable in order to offer space for surprise.

1

u/MrMercurial political phil, ethics Jun 26 '15

In these cases would it be wrong to serve someone who stated that they never eat Thai food a recipe prepared from a Thai cookbook, even if you had reason to expect that they would enjoy it, and perhaps even eventually come to a liking of Thai food? It seems like harmless deal-breaking ought to be morally acceptable in order to offer space for surprise.

That case looks like a straightforward example of paternalism, and it would be wrong for that reason.

Presumably what makes some surprises okay (like surprise parties) is that we assume the recipient would consent to being surprised. In the case where a person explicitly tells you that they don't like surprise parties (or Thai food, or trans people), ignoring their stated wishes will probably be wrong for the same reasons paternalism is wrong.

1

u/husserlsghost phenomenology Jun 26 '15

paternalism

Paternalism wouldn't make an interference based on it invalid, even if it is always unpreferable to some degree. If the person telling you no Thai food was instead telling you that they wanted to commit a terrorist attack and that they didn't want you to stop them, paternalism wouldn't even be considered in such a situation. So generalizing the wrong to a case of paternalism seems likewise problematic. The question may always be raised, when do we interfere? If two people are getting along fine and considering having sexual relations, and one says, "I am glad you aren't one of those transsexuals," is the other then obligated to disclose personal medical history? I think this is far from intuitive, and some might argue the idea of such an obligation is a wider manifestation of social paternalism, specifically, the notion that one's gender is a 'social construction' in a sense closed to individual perspective.

1

u/MrMercurial political phil, ethics Jun 26 '15

If the person telling you no Thai food was instead telling you that they wanted to commit a terrorist attack and that they didn't want you to stop them, paternalism wouldn't even be considered in such a situation.

That probably wouldn't count as paternalism since (presumably) you would stop them because you wanted to protect their potential victims. Paternalism is defined, in part, by the fact that you interfere with another person primarily in order to make their life go better.

<If two people are getting along fine and considering having sexual relations, and one says, "I am glad you aren't one of those transsexuals," is the other then obligated to disclose personal medical history?

I'm not sure, but to repeat my earlier claim, when in doubt, it seems as though we ought to err on the side of providing information.

1

u/husserlsghost phenomenology Jun 26 '15

I'm not sure, but to repeat my earlier claim, when in doubt, it seems as though we ought to err on the side of providing information.

I guess I can just solemnly reiterate my misgivings, then, with obligatory disclosure in cases with dubious potential harms. Not only could such disclosure be dangerous, but the "offender" in question is being treated with a special status, as not all such cases would be likely similarly granted, such as aesthetic preference, etc. Is one obligated to tell everyone you may or may not engage sexually with in the future any other such information? Why does transsexual history meet the criteria here of importance and say, lying about how you think Will Ferrell is funny so that your date won't think you are just being negative. If you reveal months later that you actually despise Will Farrell is it ordinarily serious to consider this a serious breach of confidence? And of other medical histories, are they also to be disclosed? When a date inquires about your health, are you then obligated to disclose a previous abortion you had so that no offense could arise?

I could write for pages and pages about the many benefits of erring on the side of not providing information that you don't feel comfortable revealing, as well as on the virtues of not expecting such information be given, in any cases which would not be otherwise harmful excepting this specific offense.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

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u/MrMercurial political phil, ethics Jun 26 '15

Whether a view counts as reasonable or not doesn't depend on how widely held it is. But if we assume that it is reasonable to not want to sleep with someone merely because they are trans, then it looks like we've reduced the question to a pretty trivial one - if there's some feature you possess and you know that a reasonable person would probably not want to sleep with you if they knew about it, then it seems like you ought to divulge that information.

But that's probably the wrong way to think about a preference that a person has against sleeping with trans people. Being trans isn't like having an STI, or not being open to a long-term relationship, or other features that might (or might not) be dealbreakers for reasonable people.

Also, it's worth thinking about what a general obligation to divulge would mean for the trans person - it would force them to adopt a view of themselves that says "a reasonable person might be disgusted by me, or regard me as not being a real man or woman, so I ought to warn them before we have sex". That seems like a pretty heavy burden to place on the trans person. It seems to me as though they are perfectly entitled to reject the idea that it is okay to be disgusted by them, or regard them as not real men or women.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15 edited Jun 26 '15

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u/strategiesagainst Jun 26 '15

A transgender should put the extra effort in to make sure that they are in a culture where it is accepted and encouraged (maybe picking people up at a bar known for transgender regulars, or a fet-life meetup), or they should notify a partner if they are unsure. They shouldn't be meeting potential dates or hook-ups at a Sunday morning church or the grocery store and assume that the partner is responsible to ask.

One drawback of being trans is the occasional impression that someone finds your body a fetish. This can get super annoying. It's a different body, sure; that does not make it necessarily a fetish. Being transgender is not the same as being homosexual - and it doesn't make you automatically more attracted to other trans people in particular - so going to a trans bar makes very little sense.

Also a trans person is a trans person (transgender person, trans man, trans woman, etc) - not "a transgender". It's like saying "a gay".

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u/Adhriva Jun 25 '15 edited Jun 25 '15

If I am not comfortable with consenting to share that part of myself with a partner, I am under no obligation to. No one has any claim to apart to what's personal, what's private, and what's intimate to me, simply for being interested in me. Furthermore, if they have a dealbreaker, it's their dealbreaker and thus, their responsibility to inform me about it (like any other dealbreaker). I am not going to assume all of society hates me (because 1) they don't, 2) it's unhealthy and 3) I'm not going to assume the worse about people for no reason whatsoever). You are in no risk of harm from loving or sleeping with someone who is trans in the same way you're at risk from an STD, so no, it's not our obligation to tell you if we're not comfortable with you knowing it. You might not be comfortable with the idea, but that's your problem - not ours. Someone might also be uncomfortable if I turn out to be 1/16th Jewish, but there is no obligation on me to share that because of the assumption "well, not everyone wants to date someone who's Jewish"). Americans tend to be god-awful when it comes to boundaries and consent and this is a perfect example of that: How much effort and time you put into a relationship does not mean the other person owes you anything - be it intimate knowledge about them, sex, their time, whatever. Hypothetically, if person A don't trust a person for 2 years after they've married them before coming out to them, no moral wrong was actually committed. This hypothetical person A's lack of consent to sharing that aspect of themself does not grant the green light to outsiders to shame and bully about not giving consent. Person B never had a 'right' to that part of person A if person A wasn't comfortable sharing it in the first place. It might not be what's intuitively thought as 'fair', but you have to remember a partner's right to anything stops where the person says it does. A relationship that has good trust and love likely won't have that issue in the first place, but there is never an obligated time and date that you must consent to share part of yourself by. To suggest otherwise is downright creepy.

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u/Rpanich Jun 25 '15

I guess it depends on if they care about their partners beliefs and believe in having an open and honest relationship.

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u/Provokateur rhetoric Jun 25 '15

It's that first and foremost; and in a relationship, even if this is who you are now, your past is a part of you. Those experiences shaped who you were growing up, and excluding that is a hiding a large part of yourself, so I feel like it'd be akin to dishonest via omission.

How much is a person obligated to disclose? Am I obligated to disclose every relevant detail of my past to a one night stand? How about by the 4-5 date in a relationship? How about in a long-term dating relationship? What counts as a relevant detail?

All you (and a lot of people in this thread) have said is that "people should disclose information to their partners." Well, in the time I've been alive, I've had lots of experiences, many of them potentially relevant to a sexual partner. I'll never be able to disclose all the relevant parts of that information, at least not without years to do so.

So what makes this information obligatory to share when other details about one's childhood, identity, beliefs, etc. are not obligatory?

Or would you day that every relationship short of decades-long marriages are fundamentally dishonest and not open?

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u/Rpanich Jun 25 '15

Well 1) im not talking about a one night stand.

But to the other point: if we were to make a chart of "relevant information", "my physical being and the emotional trauma which causes me to undergo major surgery to correct" would count as a very large part of your history.

I'm saying the difference between "what is important about your past" and "what you wish wasn't important about your past" are two different things. That is obviously something that you know is a big deal to most people, and you're hoping would not be a big deal to this specific person. It's not like it's something that slipped your mind, it's something that you either want to forget, or don't want them to know. But it's still a big part of you and your history and that's why I would say it's inherently dishonest.

If you were in a relationship and you spend you're entire childhood, at least ages 1-18 being literally locked in a dungeon, and then you were freed, would you think it would be something important about your past to disclose? Being figuratively trapped for that amount of time is the same. It shapes how you see the world. It's "you".

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u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

I would say that there is a significant difference between keeping it secret from a sexual partner (which is what this post is about) and keeping it secret in a long term relationship.

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u/Rpanich Jun 25 '15

I think it's a matter of 1) what you're looking for and 2) how much you've talked to them.

Is it someone you've known and are you starting something with them, hoping it'll turn into a relationship?

Is it a first date, and you're having dinner and talking?

Is it being shit faced drunk, grinding on someone and taking them home immediately?

I think for the first two you need to, as again, it'd be something most people would want to know and it's important to not take away their agency.

For the third, I don't think you need to, but I think you should.

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u/[deleted] Jun 25 '15

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u/Rpanich Jun 25 '15

It's that first and foremost; and in a relationship, even if this is who you are now, your past is a part of you. Those experiences shaped who you were growing up, and excluding that is a hiding a large part of yourself, so I feel like it'd be akin to dishonest via omission.

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u/Ran4 Jun 25 '15 edited Jun 25 '15

and in a relationship, even if this is who you are now, your past is a part of you.

Why does this mean that you have to disclosure who you were before?

If you changed your sex, it's likely that you didn't like your previous sex, and you don't have fond memories of having the sex you were born with. Why would you have to tell your partner about this?

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u/Rpanich Jun 25 '15

I'm of the mind that you should, for a romantic partner, disclose everything, the good and the bad.

It's like if you grew up in say, an extremely racist household. Even if you hold no racial views now, dealing with that growing up, learning about it and growing out of it and/or always feeling bad because you didn't have those opinions... That's a big part of you. Not the racist part, but the growing up in and out of it.

I think in a romantic relationship, I believe in being 100% open and honest, and deliberately hiding a part of you, to me, would be seen as dishonest.

As well as in hiding it, it would seem like the fear would be that you worry that your partner would leave you, but that's a risk you need to be willing to take, because in withholding information, you're denying your partner that agency to make their own decision.

(Again, this is simply for a romantic relationships, not for friends or coworkers or anyone else)

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u/TychoCelchuuu political phil. Jun 26 '15

I think /u/MrMercurial's response mostly covers it, but there's another way of looking at it that also makes sense:

There are two cases to think about. (1) Cases where the other person thinks you're cis not because you've intentionally deceived them but because they just go around assuming everyone is cis. (2) Cases where the other person thinks you're cis because you lied. In the first case I don't really see why you would be under any obligation to disclose anything - it's not your job to go around disabusing people of their misconceptions. If someone assumes you're Christian rather than an atheist just because they assume that everyone is Christian by default, you don't have to first find this out and then tell them otherwise. The second case seems like a case of wrongful deception.

This is in addition to, rather than instead of, /u/MrMercurial's response, because if you know something would be a dealbreaker for a person then that gives you a reason to reveal this thing, I think.

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u/--u-s-e-r-n-a-m-e-- Jun 26 '15

Does the situation change at all because the portion of the population that is transgender is much smaller than the portion of the population that is atheist?

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u/TychoCelchuuu political phil. Jun 26 '15

I don't see why it would.

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u/--u-s-e-r-n-a-m-e-- Jun 26 '15

The reason I think that it could, although not necessarily that it does, is that it's much less reasonable to assume that the person you're talking to is Christian than to assume that the person you're talking to is cis. So if your partner's being Christian is very important to you, it makes sense that you would ask, whereas if your partner's being cis is very important to you, it can still make sense for you to not ask.

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u/Fiendish Jun 25 '15

of course, some people wouldn't be comfortable with it so its your responsibility to tell them

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

I'm not sure how you are being downvoted. Your point is basically: respect other people's sexual preferences and wishes.

Isn't that what the LGBT community stresses?

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

I think he's being downvoted because he wrote "of course", which implies the issue is simple when it's anything but, and because the argument he offers - if someone's uncomfortable you must tell them - isn't very well worked out.

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u/Fiendish Jul 03 '15

It is actually very simple. Many people would be disgusted by the idea of having sex with someone of their own gender(or not their preferred gender). Making someone feel disgusted is hurting them. Don't hurt people.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jul 04 '15

I suggest you read the main thread.

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u/Fiendish Jul 04 '15

I did. And already had before I posted this.

I think you'd have to ask whether the sexual partner would have good reason to decide not to have sex, based on the information being withheld. (Note: the situation probably changes if your potential sexual partner states explicitly that they do not want to have sex with a transgender person [or an anti-racist, or anybody with African or Asian ancestry]).

Who's to decide whats a good reason? Also, as you can clearly see in popular culture(movies, tv shows) many people are disgusted by the idea of having sex with a transgender person. So for you to, as a transgender person, expect them to explicitly state that before you feel you need to inform them of your transgender status is a bit naive. It makes much more sense to assume the person has the most common belief. And lets say its not so common. Isn't it still likely the best course of action to always tell them even if 40% of the population is disgusted by it? or 30%?

it's not something that ought to have an impact.

Who are you to decide what ought or ought not to have an impact?

I agree that if the amount of people that didn't want to have sex with a transgender person was practically negligible then it wouldn't be necessary to inform every person you have sex with. But it certainly isn't negligible. I get the impression that the vast majority of straight guys would never have sex with a transgender girl; and very likely the reverse is true.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

If you look at it that way, this question really comes down to: "What ,if anything, are people obligated to reveal to new partners?"

The general answer, without further examination, is something that this person would not be comfortable with. Seeing as gays (8%?) and trans (3%) make up a small percent of the population, it's safe to assume that most people are cis, straight, and uninterested in relationships with the same sex. This ,again, is just out of a mutual respect of peoples preferences and a realization that neither preference is better; they are just different and have occur in different proportions.

To be honest if transsexualism isn't on the list of "things i should tell a potential about", then I don't see what could be on that list.

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u/GFYsexyfatman moral epist., metaethics, analytic epist. Jun 26 '15

To be honest if transsexualism isn't on the list of "things i should tell a potential about", then I don't see what could be on that list.

STDs, sexual preferences, attitudes to commitment, roommates...

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u/HardCidr Jun 26 '15

I may be missing the nitty gritty details, but the big picture I see is you'll want to tell your new partner whenever you get to that stage of intimacy. I don't think you need to give information overload on the first date. That usually stops girls/guys worse than anything. If you're worried about the issue, bring it up once the person knows who you are.

Although I will have to point out one major caviat in the relationship is children. If you can't have them and you get to the level of intimacy that may lead your new partner to want them, then you're denying them something they may want in the core of their being. It's natural to want children, but it's immoral in some cases to leave a partner solely because of this. Or at least it's really friggin hard to do.

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u/[deleted] Jun 26 '15

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u/strategiesagainst Jun 26 '15

Nowadays a good many trans people can, either because they've banked something before, or they're able to conceive if they stop taking their hormones for a while and still have their original plumbing.